The DOI matches its Crossref record; 152 of the 154 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Emotions are real
Abstract
It is obvious that emotions are real, but the question is what kind of "real" are they? In this article, I outline a theoretical approach where emotions are a part of social reality. I propose that physical changes (in the face, voice, and body, or neural circuits for behavioral adaptations like freezing, fleeing, or fighting) transform into an emotion when those changes take on psychological functions that they cannot perform by their physical nature alone. This requires socially shared conceptual knowledge that perceivers use to create meaning from these physical changes (as well as the circuitry that supports this meaning making). My claim is that emotions are, at the same time, socially constructed and biologically evident. Only when we understand all the elements that construct emotional episodes, in social, psychological, and biological terms, will we understand the nature of emotion.
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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“My hypothesis is that emotions are categories of social reality [9].”
From What is an emotion? (2019) · cites this paper as [9]
In the citing paper
“Emotion categories are as real as any other conceptual categories that require a human perceiver for existence, such as ‘money’ (i.e. the various objects that have served as currency throughout human history share no physical similarities; Barrett, 2012, 2017).”
From The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization (2016) · cites this paper as Barrett, 2012
In the citing paper
“Some of the psychological constructs used in the theory of constructed emotion are species-general (e.g. allostasis, interoception, affect, and concept), while others require the capacity for certain types of concepts (Barrett, 2012) and are more species-specific (e.g. emotion concepts).”
From The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization (2016) · cites this paper as Barrett, 2012
In the citing paper
“This error, assuming that an action is equivalent to an emotion, which I call the mental inference fallacy (Barrett, 2017), has wreaked havoc with the scientific accumulation of knowledge about emotion (also see Barrett, 2012; LeDoux, 2012).”
From The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization (2016) · cites this paper as Barrett, 2012
In the citing paper
“However, accumulating cognitive-affective neuroscience evidence from almost every domain of measurement is strongly inconsistent with this classical view of emotion and its implications (Barrett and Lida, submitted for publication).[47][48][49][50][51]”
From A new science of emotion: implications for functional neurological disorder (2022) · cites this paper as [49]
Citations
Cites
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LeDoux, J. E. (2000) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.23.1.155 · Cited by 8,444
Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion.
Russell, J. A. (2003) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.110.1.145 · Cited by 6,113 · cited 2×
“Alternatively, those who remain skeptical that emotion categories cut nature at its joints prefer to focus on data that point to the reality of affect (as valence and arousal, Russell, 2003; or as approach and avoidance; e.g., Lang & Bradley, 2008).”
BackgroundON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SOCIAL REALITY
(2018) · The Life of a Hunter · doi:10.2307/j.ctt20ks0rb.46 · Cited by 4,788
Binder, J. R., Desai, R. H., Graves, W. W., & Conant, L. L. (2009) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhp055 · Cited by 4,060
Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion.
Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1985) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-3514.48.4.813 · Cited by 4,045 · cited 1×
“…2007), as long as appraisals reflect the descriptive properties of experience (for examples of these appraisal approaches, see Clore & Ortony, 2008; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and are not considered computational mechanisms that cause emotion (for a discussion of different appraisal models, see…”
Background(1998) · Cited by 4,012
The nature of emotion: Fundamental questions.
Ekman, P., & Davidson, R. J. (1994) · Oxford University Press eBooks · Cited by 3,872
The interaction of TIGIT with PVR and PVRL2 inhibits human NK cell cytotoxicity
Stanietsky, N., Simic, H., Arapovic, J., Toporik, A., Levy, O., Novik, A., Levine, Z., Beiman, M., Dassa, L., Achdout, H., et al. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0903474106 · Cited by 3,524
Cited by
Emotional expressions reconsidered: Challenges to inferring emotion from human facial movements
Barrett, L. F., Adolphs, R., Marsella, S., Martinez, A. M., & Pollak, S. D. (2019) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1177/1529100619832930 · Cited by 1,748
Self-citationThe theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization
Barrett, L. F. (2016) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsw154 · Cited by 1,426
“Some of the psychological constructs used in the theory of constructed emotion are species-general (e.g. allosta-sis, interoception, affect, and concept), while others require the capacity for certain types of concepts (Barrett, 2012) and are more species-specific (e.g. emotion concepts).”
InfluentialSelf-citationThe theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization
Barrett, L. F. (2017) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsx060 · Cited by 1,009
“…in the classical view and even propose it as an innovation (e.g. Anderson and Adolphs, 2014), even as evidence continues to call it into doubt (e.g. Barrett, 2006a, 2016b, 2012; Barrett et al., 2007a; see Table 1 for specific neuroscience examples, with a particular focus on fear as the category…”
InfluentialSelf-citationWhy Do People Regulate Their Emotions? A Taxonomy of Motives in Emotion Regulation
Tamir, M. (2016) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868315586325 · Cited by 723
“These include hedonic benefits and various instrumental benefits, including behavioral, epistemic, and social (e.g., Barrett, 2012; Barrett & Campos, 1987; Ekman & Davidson, 1994; Frijda, 1986; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Gross, 1999; Levenson, 1999; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992; Scherer, 1984 ).”
BackgroundBarrett, L. F., & Satpute, A. B. (2013) · Current Opinion in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.conb.2012.12.012 · Cited by 642
“This social perception framework has been recently extended to understand how people construct emotional experiences by making mental state inferences about bodily changes [11 ,70].”
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Barrett, L. F.
- Affiliations
- Northeastern University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Barrett, Lisa Feldman
- Venue
- Emotion
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 413-429
- ISSN
- 1528-3542 (ISSN-L)
- 1931-1516
- OpenAlex
- W2027991937
- Cited by
- 503
- References
- 154
- Citations by year
- 2026: 49 · 2025: 37 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 37 · 2021: 46 · 2020: 42 · 2019: 53 · 2018: 33 · 2017: 35 · 2016: 31 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 20 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 8
- FWCI
- 41.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Emotion (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institutes of Health (DP1OD003312)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- emotions, social reality, social construction of emotion, biological basis of emotion, facial expressions, vocal expression, neural circuits, meaning-making, conceptual knowledge, emotion theory
- MeSH terms
- Emotions, Facial Expression, Humans, Models, Psychological, Social Behavior, Social Perception
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.