What is an emotion?

May combine two claims.

Functions are not evolutionary in origin; to assume so is teleology, which can reflect erroneous causal reasoning.

“I agree that functions are not arbitrary or unconstrained. But that does not mean functions are evolutionary in origin. To assume so is teleology, which we know can reflect erroneous causal reasoning (for example [5]).”

• cites [5] Keleman, 2013, Professional physical scientists display tenacious teleological tendencies: Purpose based reasoning as a cognitive default, J. Exp. Psychol: Gen. sourceSupported

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Emotions are functional states of the brain that causally explain certain complex behaviors such as evading a predator or attacking prey.

“In my view, emotions are the functional states of the brain that provide causal explanations of certain complex behaviors — like evading a predator or attacking prey [1,2].”

• cites [1] Adolphs, 2018Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [2] Adolphs, 2019, Emotions are functional states that cause feelings and behavior sourcePartly supported

  The Introduction (page unavailable) describes emotions as internal states that provide causal explanations of complex behavior, and Challenges explicitly uses fear-driven flight from a predator as an example. Our copy does not give attacking prey as an example of emotion-driven behavior, so that specific part of the attributed claim is not supported. (LLM, conf=0.82)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

May combine two claims.

These neurons were coding for movement velocity, suggesting involvement in regulating physical actions more generally.

“These neurons were coding for movement velocity, suggesting that they are involved in regulating physical actions more generally.”

• cites [12] Amir, 2015, Amygdala signaling during foraging in a hazardous environment, J. Neuro. sourcePartly supported

  The Open field exploration and Behavioral correlates sections report that these neurons’ firing rates varied with movement speed, supporting the velocity-coding part of the claim. The Impact, origin, and significance section proposes a way Type-1 activity could affect movement initiation, but the paper does not establish that these neurons regulate physical actions more generally. Page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.82)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

We can reliably assign emotion states to animals and people using criteria based on a theory about what emotions do.

“We can reliably assign emotion states to animals (and to people) using criteria that are based on a theory about what emotions do, on their causal relations.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Scientists may objectively measure when an animal attacks, but cannot objectively claim it was fear, anger, or a non-emotional state.

“Scientists may objectively measure when an animal attacks a conspecific, but we cannot objectively claim that this was fear, anger, or some non-emotional state like being territorial.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Any instance of emotion includes numerous features, including pleasure or displeasure, comfort or discomfort, and arousal or sleepiness.

“Any instance of emotion includes numerous features, including experiences of pleasure or displeasure, comfort or discomfort, arousal or sleepiness.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Animals consciously experience their surroundings.

“So I hypothesize that animals consciously experience their surroundings (they see, hear, taste, and so on).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Functional states provide objective, public criteria that make it possible to objectively infer them.

“As a result, functional states provide objective, public, criteria that make it possible to objectively infer them.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

For an animal to experience emotions like a human, its brain must be able to make ad hoc emotion concepts like a neurotypical human does.

“For an animal to experience emotions like a human, the animal’s brain must be able to make ad hoc emotion concepts like a neurotypical human does.”

May combine two claims.

Changes in heart rate or blood pressure have physical functions but no inherent emotional meaning.

“Research indicates that changes in heart rate or blood pressure have physical functions for maintaining the body and planning movements, but they have no inherent emotional meaning.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

A brain solves its inference problem by continually constructing ad hoc concepts to make sense of sensory data.

“So here is my hypothesis: a brain solves its inference problem by continually constructing ad hoc concepts to make sense of the cacophony arriving from its sensory organs [7,8].”

• cites [7] Barrett, 2017Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [8] Barrett, 2017, The theory of constructed emotion: An active inference account of interoception and categorization, Soc. Cog. Affect. Neuro.Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

People in different functional states process somatic and environmental information differently.

“People in these different functional states will process somatic and environmental information differently.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The clearest starting point for understanding emotions will come from ethological study of simpler animals, not human psychology.

“Yes, in my view the clearest starting point for understanding emotions will come from the ethological study of simpler animals, not from human psychology.”

May combine two claims.

Human anger can accomplish diverse purposes: removing an obstacle, enhancing performance, appearing powerful, or protecting against a hostile threat.

“For example, studies show that human anger can accomplish purposes as diverse as removing an obstacle that is blocking an important goal, helping to enhance performance to win a competition or a negotiation, allowing a person to appear powerful or signal dominance, or protecting against a hostile threat [7].”

• cites [7] Barrett, 2017Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The function of anger varies situationally, depending on context.

“But the available data lead me to hypothesize that the function of anger will vary situationally, depending on the context.”

• cites [7] Barrett, 2017Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Emotions are categories of social reality.

“My hypothesis is that emotions are categories of social reality [9].”

• cites [9] Barrett, 2012, Emotions are real, Emotion sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

An infant brain learns sensory-motor patterns that become available for later predictions.

“An infant brain learns them. As an infant brain develops, it is learning the sensory-motor patterns that become available for later predictions.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

All existing taxonomies anchored in folk psychology categories will have the same problems and are not a useful guide for scientific investigation.

“Yes. All existing taxonomies that are anchored in folk psychology categories will have the same problems and therefore are not a useful guide for scientific investigation.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Instances of emotion include unconscious physical features and unconscious inferences.

“Instances of emotion also include numerous unconscious physical features, such as changes within the internal milieu of the body, as well as the unconscious inferences that result in a conscious experience of the surrounding world during the emotional state (sights, smells, tastes, and so on); this latter experience is not an emotional experience.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The functional role of conscious experience of emotion is unknown.

“We can come up with a functional story about the actual emotion (preventing harm and so on), but the functional role of their conscious experience is unknown.”

May combine two claims.

Functions are not unique but neither are they arbitrary.

“Of course, functions are not unique. But neither are they arbitrary.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Emotions are embodied representations that shape action and become experience.

“Emotions, in my view, are those embodied representations that shape the animal’s action and become the animal’s experience of the world in that upcoming moment.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

There is a single functionally-described state for instances of the same emotion category, such as fear or anger.

“I think that there is a single functionally-described state for instances of the same emotion category — fear, anger and so on.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Emotions are individuated by how sensations are categorized and actions are planned.

“Emotions are individuated by how sensations are categorized and actions are planned.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Human inference is necessary to construct instances of emotion.

“One difference between our perspectives, I think, is that I propose human inference is necessary to construct instances of emotion, whereas your view is that human inference identifies instances of emotion but plays no role in constructing them.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

If fear is induced in a rat, the functions of that fear include defense from threat, and they are evolutionary in origin, so there is a fact of the matter about which functions are relevant.

“If I induce fear in a rat, the functions of that fear include defense from threat, and so on. They are evolutionary in origin so there is a fact of the matter about which functions, out of all possible ones I could conjure up, are relevant.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Whenever a brain reimplements past instances of anger to construct an ad hoc concept of anger for guiding action, anger is constructed.

“Whenever a brain reimplements past instances of anger to construct an ad hoc concept of anger for the purposes of guiding action, anger is constructed.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

What we learn about emotion in any experiment is determined by how we define emotions.

“What we learn (or fail to learn) about emotion in any experiment is determined by how we define emotions in the first place.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

For homologous action circuits to become emotion circuits, one must stipulate a mental inference that observed actions are caused by certain functions or goals.

“I disagree — there may be homologous circuits for actions, but for these to become circuits for emotions, you have to stipulate a mental inference that observed actions (for example, freezing) are caused by certain functions or goals (for example, protecting against threat in fear).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The evidence argues for homologous emotion circuits shared by humans and many other mammals.

“Yes. In fact, I think the evidence argues for homologous emotion circuits that are shared by humans and many other mammals.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Two instances become anger by virtue of human inferences of similarity.

“So, two instances become anger by virtue of human inferences of similarity.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

These features are called affect, arise from allostatic control, and are not specific to emotion.

“In my work, we refer to these features of experience as affect, and they arise from the brain’s continual allostatic control of the body, so they are not specific to instances of emotion.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The ad hoc fear concept is a functional state of fear that prepares the animal to act and experience the world in a specific way.

“In effect, the ad hoc fear concept is a functional state of fear that is preparing the animal to act and experience the world in a specific way.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S4 (based).

The same processes are at work when the brain creates an instance of emotion and when it creates non-emotion states.

“I hypothesize that the same processes are at work when the brain creates an instance of emotion and when it creates non-emotion states.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Context is under-appreciated.

“Second: context is under-appreciated.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

The distinction between affect and emotion is underappreciated.

“Fourth: the distinction between affect and emotion is underappreciated.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Within-category variability is under-appreciated.

“First: within-category variability is under-appreciated.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Affect derives from interoception, so any brain state involving interoception necessarily has affective properties.

“Affect derives from interoception, and so any brain state that involves interoception will necessarily have affective properties (at least in vertebrates).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

The influence of scientists' own inferences is under-appreciated, leading to confusion between what is measured and what is inferred.

“Third: the influence of scientists’ own inferences is under-appreciated, leading them to confuse what is measured with what is inferred.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

There is a lack of clarity in what people mean by 'emotion'.

“I would also add the lack of clarity in what people mean by ‘emotion’.”