Distinguishing how from why the mind wanders: A process–occurrence framework for self-generated mental activity.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 105 of the 105 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Cognition can unfold with little regard to the events taking place in the environment, and such self-generated mental activity poses a specific set of challenges for its scientific analysis in both cognitive science and neuroscience. One problem is that the spontaneous onset of self-generated mental activity makes it hard to distinguish the events that control the occurrence of the experience from those processes that ensure the continuity of an internal train of thought once initiated. This review demonstrates that a distinction between process and occurrence (a) provides theoretical clarity that has been absent from current discussions of self-generated mental activity, (b) affords conceptual leverage on seemingly disparate results associating the state with both domain-general processes and task error, and (c) draws attention to important questions for understanding unconstrained thought in contexts such as psychopathology and education. It is suggested that identifying the moment that self-generated mental events begin is a necessary next step in moving toward a testable account of why the mind has evolved to neglect the present in favor of ruminations on the past or imaginary musings of what may yet come to pass.
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In the citing paper
“Self-generated thoughts arise from internally-focused mental activity that is largely independent of external input [4].”
From Creative Cognition and Brain Network Dynamics (2016) · cites this paper as [4]
In the citing paper
“The anticorrelation between perceptual and internal systems may reflect a necessary condition for the brain to focus in a detailed manner on one stream to the exclusion of the other.2,181,182”
From The default network and self-generated thought: component processes, dynamic control, and clinical relevance (2014) · cites this paper as [2]
In the citing paper
“Together these findings have been suggested to reflect the experiential equivalent of the contextual changes in the correlation between the frontoparietal and default networks,2 and provide support for the context regulation hypothesis10”
From The default network and self-generated thought: component processes, dynamic control, and clinical relevance (2014) · cites this paper as [2]
In the citing paper
“Altogether these studies provide experiential evidence that the occurrence of self-generated thought reduces the processing of sensory information, a phenomenon which has been termed perceptual decoupling.1,2,154,155”
From The default network and self-generated thought: component processes, dynamic control, and clinical relevance (2014) · cites this paper as [2]
In the citing paper
“Given its intricate nature, the full extent of self-generated thought is unlikely to be attributable to a single network of regions, and the brain regions involved in self-generated thought may critically depend upon both the content underlying the experience (see also Ref. 247) and the precise process by which the experience occurs.2”
From The default network and self-generated thought: component processes, dynamic control, and clinical relevance (2014) · cites this paper as [2]
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A default mode of brain function
Raichle, M. E., MacLeod, A. M., Snyder, A. Z., Powers, W. J., Gusnard, D. A., & Shulman, G. L. (2001) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.98.2.676 · Cited by 12,190 · cited 2×
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BackgroundFunctional connectivity in the motor cortex of resting human brain using echo‐planar mri
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“…anticorrelated with elements thought to be involved in the generation of self-referential or episodic thought (e.g., the medial PFC [mPFC]; Fox & Raichle, 2007; Spreng, Stevens, 4 The fact that the decoupling hypothesis is the only theory covered in this article concerned with ensuring…”
BackgroundCorrespondence of the brain's functional architecture during activation and rest
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“More generally, evidence from neuroscience indicates that all of the known task-related systems can exhibit neural activation in lieu of an external stimulus (S. M. Smith et al., 2009).”
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Wandering minds: the default network and stimulus-independent thought
Mason, M. F., Norton, M. I., Van Horn, J. D., Wegner, D. M., Grafton, S. T., & Macrae, C. N. (2007) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1131295 · Cited by 2,792 · cited 2×
“…with this assumption, unpracticed motor tasks or tasks like random number generation with an executive control component reduce reports of mind wandering (Mason et al., 2007; Teasdale et al., 1995), and under these circumstances, self-generated cognition is less structured (Teasdale et al. 1995).”
BackgroundBuckner, R. L., & Carroll, D. C. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.004 · Cited by 2,691
A wandering mind is an unhappy mind
Killingsworth, M. A., & Gilbert, D. T. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1192439 · Cited by 2,575 · cited 2×
“This has led to a large amount of coverage in the popular press for research on both the costs and benefits of mind wandering (e.g., Lehrer, 2011; Zimmer, 2009).”
BackgroundResultExperimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing
Dehaene, S., & Changeux, J.-P. (2011) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.018 · Cited by 2,573 · cited 2×
“In contemporary accounts of consciousness, the mechanism by which conscious thought emerges is described as the process of ignition (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011).”
BackgroundThe variable nature of cognitive control: a dual mechanisms framework
Braver, T. S. (2012) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.12.010 · Cited by 2,482 · cited 10×
“The dLPFC may implement selected top-down plans (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012), while the left inferior frontal gyrus has been implicated in the coordination of memorial information in attention, for multiple purposes, including working memory (Badre & Wagner, 2007; E. E. Smith & Jonides, 1999), as well as a large number of…”
BackgroundInfluential
Cited by
Andrews‐Hanna, J. R., Smallwood, J., & Spreng, R. N. (2014) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/nyas.12360 · Cited by 2,102
Self-citationThe Science of Mind Wandering: Empirically Navigating the Stream of Consciousness
Smallwood, J., & Schooler, J. W. (2015) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015331 · Cited by 1,685
“At present there is no consensus on the precise relationship between mind wandering and executive control, despite the identification of a clear link between them (McVay & Kane 2010, Smallwood 2010).”
BackgroundSelf-citationMind-wandering as spontaneous thought: a dynamic framework
Christoff, K., Irving, Z. C., Fox, K. C. R., Spreng, R. N., & Andrews-Hanna, J. R. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.113 · Cited by 1,376
Creative Cognition and Brain Network Dynamics
Beaty, R. E., Benedek, M., Silvia, P. J., & Schacter, D. L. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.10.004 · Cited by 1,105
The default mode network in cognition: a topographical perspective
Smallwood, J., Bernhardt, B. C., Leech, R., Bzdok, D., Jefferies, E., & Margulies, D. S. (2021) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-021-00474-4 · Cited by 935
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Metadata
- Authors
- Smallwood, J.
- Affiliations
- Max Planck Society (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Smallwood, Jonathan
- ORCID
- Smallwood, Jonathan
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 2013-05
- Volume
- 139
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 519-535
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W2133128608
- Cited by
- 564
- References
- 105
- Citations by year
- 2026: 23 · 2025: 32 · 2024: 59 · 2023: 38 · 2022: 44 · 2021: 39 · 2020: 47 · 2019: 40 · 2018: 51 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 45 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 29 · 2013: 30
- FWCI
- 25.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Mind wandering and attention
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
- Keywords
- mind wandering, spontaneous thought, domain-general processes, task errors, psychopathology, rumination, cognitive evolution
- MeSH terms
- Attention, Cognition, Fantasy, Humans, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Models, Psychological, Perception, Functional Neuroimaging
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- Smallwood, J. (2013). Distinguishing how from why the mind wanders: A process–occurrence framework for self-generated mental activity. Psychological Bulletin. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030010
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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