Professional physical scientists display tenacious teleological tendencies: Purpose based reasoning as a cognitive default
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 70 of the 71 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Teleological explanations account for objects and events by reference to a functional consequence or purpose. Although they are popular in religion, they are unpopular in science: Physical scientists in particular explicitly reject them when explaining natural phenomena. However, prior research provides reasons to suspect that this explanatory form may represent a default explanatory preference. As a strong test of this hypothesis, we explored whether physical scientists endorse teleological explanations of natural phenomena when their information-processing resources are limited. In Study 1, physical scientists from top-ranked American universities judged explanations as true or false, either at speed or without time restriction. Like undergraduates and age-matched community participants, scientists demonstrated increased acceptance of unwarranted teleological explanations under speed despite maintaining high accuracy on control items. Scientists' overall endorsement of inaccurate teleological explanation was lower than comparison groups, however. In Study 2, we explored this further and found that the teleological tendencies of professional scientists did not differ from those of humanities scholars. Thus, although extended education appears to produce an overall reduction in inaccurate teleological explanation, specialization as a scientist does not, in itself, additionally ameliorate scientifically inaccurate purpose-based theories about the natural world. A religion-consistent default cognitive bias toward teleological explanation tenaciously persists and may have subtle but profound consequences for scientific progress.
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“Education mitigates teleological thinking.”
From The Challenge of Evolution to Religion (2019) · cites this paper as Kelemen et al., 2013
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“scientists who have stronger Gaia beliefs are more prone to teleology than scientists who hold explicit traditional theistic beliefs or no supernatural beliefs.”
From The Challenge of Evolution to Religion (2019) · cites this paper as Kelemen et al. (2013)
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“I agree that functions are not arbitrary or unconstrained. But that does not mean functions are evolutionary in origin. To assume so is teleology, which we know can reflect erroneous causal reasoning (for example [5]).”
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“These intuitions tend to translate in religious beliefs, but they can also contribute to a 103 quasi-religious view on nature [30,31].”
From Fatal attraction: the intuitive appeal of GMO opposition (2015) · cites this paper as [31]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kelemen, D., Rottman, J., & Seston, R.
- Affiliations
- Boston University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Kelemen, Deborah
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Published
- 2013
- Volume
- 142
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1074-1083
- ISSN
- 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-2222
- OpenAlex
- W2322579942
- Cited by
- 429
- References
- 71
- Citations by year
- 2026: 12 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 81 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 30 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 38 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 34 · 2017: 23 · 2016: 32 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 9
- FWCI
- 116.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Experimental Psychology General (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- John Templeton Foundation
- National Science Foundation (DRL-1007984, DGE-0741448)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Evolution and Science Education
- Social Sciences › Education › Science Education and Pedagogy
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- teleological reasoning, physical scientists, cognitive biases, scientific explanation, humanities scholars, scientific specialization
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Cognition, Female, Humans, Judgment, Male
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