A social comparison theory meta-analysis 60+ years on.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 86 of the 86 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
These meta-analyses of 60+ years of social comparison research focused on 2 issues: the choice of a comparison target (selection) and the effects of comparisons on self-evaluations, affect, and so forth (reaction). Selection studies offering 2 options (up or down) showed a strong preference (and no evidence of publication bias) for upward choices when there was no threat; there was no evidence for downward comparison as a dominant choice even when threatened. Selections became less differentiable when a lateral choice was also provided. For reaction studies, contrast was, by far, the dominant response to social comparison, with ability estimates most strongly affected. Moderator analyses, tests and adjustments for publication bias showed that contrast is stronger when the comparison involves varying participants' standing for ability (effect estimates, -0.75 to -0.65) and affect (-0.83 to -0.65). Novel personal attributes were subject to strong contrast for ability (-0.5 to -0.6) and affect (-0.6 to -0.7). Dissimilarity priming was associated with contrast (-0.44 to -0.27; no publication bias), consistent with Mussweiler (2003). Similarity priming provided modest support for Collins (1996) and Mussweiler (2003), with very weak assimilation effects, depending on the publication bias estimator. Studies including control groups indicated effects in response to upward and downward targets were comparable in size and contrastive. Limitations of the literature (e.g., small number of studies including no-comparison control conditions), unresolved issues, and why people choose to compare upward when the most likely result is self-deflating contrast are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record
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“Though evidence on this topic remains limited, social comparison theory implies that adolescents might be more influenced by the images that show similar targets, like sharing their gender (Gerber et al., 2018).”
From Navigating Beauty Standards on Social Media: Impact of Appearance Activity on Adolescents’ Body Dissatisfaction (2025) · cites this paper as Gerber et al., 2018
In the citing paper
“Both the exposure to upward comparisons and their extreme nature are central contributors to the emotional consequences of social media use (Gerber et al., 2018; Schmuck et al., 2019; Irmer and Schmiedek, 2023).”
From The associations between social comparison on social media and young adults’ mental health (2025) · cites this paper as Gerber et al., 2018
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Cited by
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Zhang, Q., Zhu, L., Li, W., Shao, Y., & Sun, B. (2026) · Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.3390/bs16101856
“Instead, behavioral baselines are primarily disrupted by the sense of deprivation and inferiority induced by upward comparison, which activates self-preservation instincts (Gerber et al., 2018).”
The Hero-Hobbyist Dichotomy and Independent Work: A Conceptual ModelPreprint
Morrison, T. E. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.7597571
Zhuravleva, E., Harré, N., & Gibson, K. L. (2026) · Journal of Environmental Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103249
Deshpande, A., Kaul, N., Kumar, C., & Raut, R. (2026) · International Journal of Event and Festival Management · doi:10.1108/ijefm-10-2025-0172
Christensen, M. E. (2026) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592726105854
The Comparative Regime: How Pseudo‐Objective Standards Constitute Desire
Askari, M. (2026) · Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour · doi:10.1111/jtsb.70068
Lu, J., Li, Y., Qiu, J., & Li, C. (2026) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1982610
Metadata
- Authors
- Gerber, J. P., Wheeler, L., & Suls, J.
- Affiliations
- Gordon College (US)
- Macquarie University (AU)
- National Cancer Institute (US)
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 2018-02
- Volume
- 144
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 177-197
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W2768108654
- Cited by
- 808
- References
- 86
- Citations by year
- 2026: 123 · 2025: 138 · 2024: 145 · 2023: 134 · 2022: 91 · 2021: 68 · 2020: 61 · 2019: 34 · 2018: 13
- FWCI
- 76.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Australia Research Council
- Gordon College
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Death Anxiety and Social Exclusion
- Keywords
- social comparison theory, upward social comparison, downward social comparison, contrast effects, self-assessment, affect, ability estimation, assimilation, publication bias
- MeSH terms
- Humans, Psychological Theory, Self Concept, Social Perception
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