The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Conservatism in a simple probability inference task.
Abstract
3 experiments investigated the effects on posterior probability estimates of: (1) prior probabilities, amount of data, and diagnostic impact of the data; (2) payoffs; and (3) response modes. Ss usually behaved conservatively, i.e., the difference between their prior and posterior probability estimates was less than that prescribed by Bayes' theorem. Conservatism was unaffected by prior probabilities, remained constant as the amount of data increased, and decreased as the diagnostic value of each datum decreased. More learning occurred under payoff than under nonpayoff conditions and between-S variance was less under payoff conditions. Estimates were most nearly Bayesian under the (formally inappropriate) linear payoff, but considerable overestimation resulted; the log payoff condition yielded less conservatism than the quadratic payoff. Estimates were most nearly Bayesian when Ss estimated odds on a logarithmic scale.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Bayesian statistical inference for psychological research.
Edwards, W., Lindman, H., & Savage, L. J. (1963) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0044139 · Cited by 1,734
Self-citationConservatism in Complex Probabilistic Inference
Phillips, L. D., Hays, W. L., & Edwards, W. (1966) · IEEE Transactions on Human Factors in Electronics · doi:10.1109/thfe.1966.231978 · Cited by 231
Self-citationSample size and the revision of subjective probabilities.
Peterson, C. R., Schneider, R. J., & Miller, A. J. (1965) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0021720 · Cited by 193
Sensitivity of subjective probability revision.
Peterson, C. R., & Miller, A. J. (1965) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0022023 · Cited by 180
Costs and payoffs are instructions.
Edwards, W. (1961) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0044699 · Cited by 54
Self-citationA scale for the measurement of subjective probability
Naerssen, R. F. V. (1962) · Acta Psychologica · doi:10.1016/0001-6918(62)90015-x · Cited by 31
Cited by
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.136 · Cited by 3,024
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Metadata
- Authors
- Phillips, L. D., & Edwards, W.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology
- Published
- 1966
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 346-354
- ISSN
- 0022-1015 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2027369625
- Cited by
- 856
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 13.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Conservatism in a simple probability inference task. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037/h0023653
- The paper
- Phillips, L. D., & Edwards, W. (1966). Conservatism in a simple probability inference task. Journal of Experimental Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0023653
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.