Moral appraisals guide intuitive legal determinations
Abstract
OBJECTIVES: We sought to understand how basic competencies in moral reasoning influence the application of private, institutional, and legal rules. HYPOTHESES: We predicted that moral appraisals, implicating both outcome-based and mental state reasoning, would shape participants' interpretation of rules and statutes-and asked whether these effects arise differentially under intuitive and reflective reasoning conditions. METHOD: In six vignette-based experiments (total N = 2,473; 293 university law students [67% women; age bracket mode: 18-22 years] and 2,180 online workers [60% women; mean age = 31.9 years]), participants considered a wide range of written rules and laws and determined whether a protagonist had violated the rule in question. We manipulated morally relevant aspects of each incident-including the valence of the rule's purpose (Study 1) and of the outcomes that ensued (Studies 2 and 3), as well as the protagonist's accompanying mental state (Studies 5 and 6). In two studies, we simultaneously varied whether participants decided under time pressure or following a forced delay (Studies 4 and 6). RESULTS: Moral appraisals of the rule's purpose, the agent's extraneous blameworthiness, and the agent's epistemic state impacted legal determinations and helped to explain participants' departure from rules' literal interpretation. Counter-literal verdicts were stronger under time pressure and were weakened by the opportunity to reflect. CONCLUSIONS: Under intuitive reasoning conditions, legal determinations draw on core competencies in moral cognition, such as outcome-based and mental state reasoning. In turn, cognitive reflection dampens these effects on statutory interpretation, allowing text to play a more influential role. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
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Their results showed that ordinary judgments of rule violation are much more sensitive to morally good than morally bad purposes, which suggests an influence of moral appraisals over the folk concept of rule.
“Their results showed that ordinary judgments of rule violation are much more sensitive to morally good than morally bad purposes, which suggests an influence of moral appraisals over the folk concept of rule.”
From Exploring the psychology of LLMs’ moral and legal reasoning (2024) · cites this paper as Flanagan et al., 2023
Flanagan and colleagues (2023) manipulated whether the rule's text and intended goal were violated, and whether the intended goal was morally good or bad.
“To find out precisely what goes into the purpose or spirit of the law, Flanagan and colleagues (2023) manipulated not only whether the rule's text and the rule's intended goal were violated, but also whether the intended goal was morally good or morally bad (their Study 1).”
From Exploring the psychology of LLMs’ moral and legal reasoning (2024) · cites this paper as Flanagan et al., 2023
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- Authors
- Flanagan, B., de Almeida, G. F. C. F., Struchiner, N., & Hannikainen, I. R.
- Affiliations
- National University of Ireland, Maynooth (IE)
- Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (BR)
- Universidad de Granada (ES)
- Venue
- Law and Human Behavior
- Published
- 2023-04
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 367-383
- ISSN
- 0147-7307 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-661X
- OpenAlex
- W4365447337
- Cited by
- 16
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2
- FWCI
- 2.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Law and Human Behavior (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Maynooth University
- Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (PID2020-119791RA-I00)
- National Council of Scientific and Technological Development of Brazil (309735/2019-0)
- Carlos Chagas Filho Research Support Foundation (E-26/201.071/2021)
- Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (001)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Law › Legal processes and jurisprudence
- Keywords
- moral reasoning, legal judgment, statutory interpretation, intuitive thinking, cognitive reflection, mental state reasoning, culpability, epistemic states, time pressure, law students
- MeSH terms
- Adolescent, Adult, Cognition, Female, Humans, Judgment, Male, Morals, Problem Solving, Young Adult
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