Falsifiability is not optional.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Finkel, Eastwick, and Reis (2016; FER2016) argued the post-2011 methodological reform movement has focused narrowly on replicability, neglecting other essential goals of research. We agree multiple scientific goals are essential, but argue, however, a more fine-grained language, conceptualization, and approach to replication is needed to accomplish these goals. Replication is the general empirical mechanism for testing and falsifying theory. Sufficiently methodologically similar replications, also known as direct replications, test the basic existence of phenomena and ensure cumulative progress is possible a priori. In contrast, increasingly methodologically dissimilar replications, also known as conceptual replications, test the relevance of auxiliary hypotheses (e.g., manipulation and measurement issues, contextual factors) required to productively investigate validity and generalizability. Without prioritizing replicability, a field is not empirically falsifiable. We also disagree with FER2016's position that "bigger samples are generally better, but . . . that very large samples could have the downside of commandeering resources that would have been better invested in other studies" (abstract). We identify problematic assumptions involved in FER2016's modifications of our original research-economic model, and present an improved model that quantifies when (and whether) it is reasonable to worry that increasing statistical power will engender potential trade-offs. Sufficiently powering studies (i.e., >80%) maximizes both research efficiency and confidence in the literature (research quality). Given that we are in agreement with FER2016 on all key open science points, we are eager to start seeing the accelerated rate of cumulative knowledge development of social psychological phenomena such a sufficiently transparent, powered, and falsifiable approach will generate. (PsycINFO Database Record
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Cites
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Cited by
Psychology, Science, and Knowledge Construction: Broadening Perspectives from the Replication Crisis
Shrout, P. E., & Rodgers, J. L. (2018) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-122216-011845 · Cited by 725
Zwaan, R. A., Etz, A., Lucas, R. E., & Donnellan, M. B. (2018) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x17001972 · Cited by 444
Moshontz, H., Campbell, L., Ebersole, C. R., IJzerman, H., Urry, H. L., Forscher, P. S., Grahe, J. E., McCarthy, R. J., Musser, E. D., Antfolk, J., et al. (2018) · Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/2515245918797607 · Cited by 377
Self-citationHorstmann, K. T., Rauthmann, J. F., Sherman, R. A., & Ziegler, M. (2021) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/pspp0000357 · Cited by 89
Fyfe, E. R., de Leeuw, J. R., Carvalho, P. F., Goldstone, R. L., Sherman, J., Admiraal, D., Alford, L. K., Bonner, A., Brassil, C. E., Brooks, C. A., et al. (2021) · Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/25152459211027575 · Cited by 59
Schurer, T., Opitz, B., & Schubert, T. (2023) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/s13421-022-01295-1 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- LeBel, E. P., Berger, D., Campbell, L., & Loving, T. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Published
- 2017-08
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 254-261
- ISSN
- 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1315
- OpenAlex
- W2735878894
- Cited by
- 105
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 17.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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