Altercentric interference in level 1 visual perspective taking reflects the ascription of mental states, not submentalizing.
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A growing body of work suggests that in some circumstances, humans may be capable of ascribing mental states to others in a way that is fast, cognitively efficient, and implicit (implicit mentalizing hypothesis). However, the interpretation of this work has recently been challenged by suggesting that the observed effects may reflect "submentalizing" effects of attention and memory, with no ascription of mental states (submentalizing hypothesis). The present study employed a strong test between these hypotheses by examining whether apparently automatic processing of another's visual perspective is influenced by experience-dependent beliefs about whether that person can see. Altercentric interference was observed when participants judged their own perspective on stimuli involving an avatar wearing goggles that participants believed to be transparent but not when they believed the goggles to be opaque. These results are consistent with participants ascribing mental states to the avatar and not with the submentalizing hypothesis that altercentric interference arises merely because avatars cue shifts in spatial attention. (PsycINFO Database Record
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Cites
Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth about False Belief
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00304 · Cited by 4,476
Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states
Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. A. (2009) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0016923 · Cited by 1,261
Self-citationAction Anticipation Through Attribution of False Belief by 2-Year-Olds
Southgate, V., Senju, A., & Csibra, G. (2007) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x · Cited by 1,066 · cited 1×
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False-belief understanding in infants
Baillargeon, R., Scott, R. M., & He, Z. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.12.006 · Cited by 1,030 · cited 1×
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Attribution of Beliefs by 13-Month-Old Infants
Surian, L., Caldi, S., & Sperber, D. (2007) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01943.x · Cited by 811
(2011) · doi:10.4324/9780203833926 · Cited by 249
Self-citation“I know, you know”: epistemic egocentrism in children and adults
Royzman, E. B., Cassidy, K. W., & Baron, J. (2003) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.7.1.38 · Cited by 246 · cited 1×
“This lack of egocentric intrusion may appear surprising given the robustness and generality of egocentric biases (e.g., Royzman et al., 2003).”
Seeing other minds: Attributed mental states influence perception
Teufel, C., Fletcher, P. C., & Davis, G. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.05.005 · Cited by 199 · cited 1×
“The belief induction procedure provides a valuable strategy to overcome this limitation, ensuring full control over stimulus properties (see also Heyes, 2014; Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010).”
Cited by
Sacheli, L. M., Arcangeli, E., Carioti, D., Butterfill, S., & Berlingeri, M. (2022) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1177/17470218211050198 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Furlanetto, T., Becchio, C., Samson, D., & Apperly, I.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance
- Published
- 2016-02
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 158-163
- ISSN
- 0096-1523 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1277
- OpenAlex
- W1962136613
- Cited by
- 161
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 25.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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