Evolutionary instability of zero-determinant strategies demonstrates that winning is not everything
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Zero-determinant strategies are a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies that are able to unilaterally set the expected payoff of an opponent in iterated plays of the Prisoner’s Dilemma irrespective of the opponent’s strategy (coercive strategies), or else to set the ratio between the player’s and their opponent’s expected payoff (extortionate strategies). Here we show that zero-determinant strategies are at most weakly dominant, are not evolutionarily stable, and will instead evolve into less coercive strategies. We show that zero-determinant strategies with an informational advantage over other players that allows them to recognize each other can be evolutionarily stable (and able to exploit other players). However, such an advantage is bound to be short-lived as opposing strategies evolve to counteract the recognition. In iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games, zero-determinant strategies are able to define the opponent’s payoff regardless of the opponent’s strategy. Here the authors show that zero-determinant strategies are not evolutionary stable in adapting populations, and instead evolve into non-coercive strategies.
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Citations
Cites
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725 · cited 1×
“based ZD strategy is only favored if it is the only one that can recognize itself. Indeed, tag-based recognition is used to enhance cooperation among animals via the so-called \greenbeard" eect [24,25], and can give rise to cycles between mutualism and altruism [26]. Recognizing a strategy from behavior rather th…”
BackgroundEvolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502 · cited 1×
“ith Pavlov. Yet, Pavlov is the ESS because it cooperates with itself, so h(~q) = 3. We can check that Pavlov is the ESS by following the population fractions as determined by the replicator equations [5,13,15], which describe the frequencies of strategies in a population ˇ_ i = ˇ i(w i w); (6) where ˇ i is the populat…”
BackgroundEvolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life
NOWAK, M. A. (2006) · doi:10.2307/j.ctvjghw98 · Cited by 2,438
A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
Nowak, M., & Sigmund, K. (1993) · Nature · doi:10.1038/364056a0 · Cited by 1,797
Sigmund, K. (2010) · doi:10.1515/9781400832255 · Cited by 570
Cited by
From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Stewart, A. J., & Plotkin, J. B. (2013) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1306246110 · Cited by 261
Small Groups and Long Memories Promote Cooperation
Stewart, A. J., & Plotkin, J. B. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep26889 · Cited by 78
Metadata
- Authors
- Adami, C., & Hintze, A.
- Venue
- Nature Communications
- Published
- 2013-08-01
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 2193-2193
- ISSN
- 2041-1723 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2108913511
- Cited by
- 199
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 57.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Adami, C., & Hintze, A. (2013). Evolutionary instability of zero-determinant strategies demonstrates that winning is not everything. Nature Communications. https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms3193
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