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Cited by 261

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

Stewart, Alexander J., Plotkin, Joshua B.·2013·Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
DOI 10.1073/pnas.1306246110
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Abstract

Significance: Cooperative behavior seems at odds with the Darwinian principle of survival of the fittest, yet cooperation is abundant in nature. Scientists have used the Prisoner Dilemma game, in which players must choose to cooperate or defect, to study the emergence and stability of cooperation. Recent work has uncovered a remarkable class of extortion strategies that provide one player a disproportionate payoff when facing an unwitting opponent. Extortion strategies perform very well in head-to-head competitions, but they fare poorly in large, evolving populations. Rather we identify a closely related set of generous strategies, which cooperate with others and forgive defection, that replace extortionists and dominate in large populations. Our results help to explain the evolution of cooperation.

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Crossref · 10.1073/pnas.1306246110

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  • Evolutionary game theory shows that cooperative equilibria can be achieved due to the crucial role of players signalling their trustworthiness and reliability by choosing the cooperative strategy and bearing the cost for it in the presence of non-cooperative choices by other players.

    “The evolutionary game theory literature also shows that cooperative equilibria can be achieved due to the crucial role of players signalling their trustworthiness and reliability by choosing the cooperative strat­ egy and bearing the cost for it in the presence of non-cooperative choices by other players (Hilbe et al., 2013; Stewart and Plotkin, 2013).”

    From Win Together or Lose Alone: Circular Economy and Hybrid Governance for Natural Resource Commons (2024) · cites this paper as Stewart and Plotkin, 2013

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Citations

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Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 22

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  13. Akin E (2012) Stable cooperative solutions for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. arXiv :1211.0969. · arXiv
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  15. 10.1017/CBO9780511806292 · DOI
  16. 10.1126/science.1183665 · DOI · Paper page
  17. 10.1038/nature02414 · DOI
  18. 10.1103/PhysRevE.74.011909 · DOI
  19. 10.1098/rspb.2009.1171 · DOI
  20. P Ball Physicists suggest selfishness can pay. Available at www.nature.com/news/physicists-suggest-selfishness-can-pay-1.11254. Accessed August 22 2013. (2012). · DOI
  21. 10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.03.027 · DOI
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Metadata

Authors
Stewart, A. J., & Plotkin, J. B.
Affiliations
Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Publisher
National Academy of Sciences
Published
2013-09-03
Volume
110
Issue
38
Pages
15348-15353
ISSN
  • 0027-8424
  • 1091-6490
DOI
10.1073/pnas.1306246110
Cited by
261
References
2
Language
en

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