Negative verbal probabilities undermine communication of climate science
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Abstract
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recommends describing low-probability outcomes using negative verbal probability terms such as unlikely, rather than positive terms such as a small probability. However, we propose that this choice of probability terms might undermine public perception and understanding of climate science. Across eight preregistered experiments ( N = 4,150), we find that participants perceive outcomes described with negative low probability terms as reflecting lower scientific consensus than probabilistically equivalent but positively framed terms. The effect persists after controlling for beliefs in climate change, familiarity with the IPCC and political orientation, although it weakens when the projected values exceeded participants’ personal expectations. Participants also associate negative low-probability terms more strongly with extreme outcomes and judge them as less evidence-based than their positive counterparts. We recommend using positive verbal probabilities to communicate comparable levels of uncertainty without undermining perceptions of scientific consensus and evidence.
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## TL;DR
Across eight preregistered experiments with 4,150 participants, the paper finds that IPCC-style negative verbal probabilities such as “unlikely” make climate projections seem less consensual and less evidence-based than numerically equivalent positive framings. The authors argue that positive verbal probabilities or numerical expressions better communicate low-probability climate risks without undermining perceived scientific agreement.
## Key findings
- In experiment 1 with 301 UK residents, the four verbal probabilities were judged to mean roughly the same probability, in the 10–30% range peaking around 15–20%, with no significant difference in translation to numeric probability, F(3, 300) = 2.16, P = 0.093, ηP² = 0.02.
- Negative terms were associated with more disagreement and more extreme outcomes: in experiment 1, “unlikely” led to 61% out-of-range outcomes versus 21% for “there is a small probability,” and perceived disagreement was higher for negative than positive phrases.
- In experiment 3 with 414 UK residents, perceived consensus was higher for positive than for negative wording for both temperature and precipitation projections: t(399.37) = 11.89, P < 0.001, d = 1.17, and t(412) = 2.18, P = 0.030, d = 0.21; perceived evidence was also higher for positive wording in temperature, t(404.38) = -7.85, P < 0.001, d = 0.77.
- In experiment 5 with 802 participants, “small probability” and a numerical 10–33% probability yielded higher perceived consensus than “unlikely” and “likely … not,” with a strong overall effect of format, F(3, 801) = 31.73, P < 0.001, η² = 0.11; concern did not differ across conditions, F(3, 801) = 1.13, P = 0.337, ηP² < 0.01.
## Methods
- The paper reports eight preregistered experiments; the main text gives detailed methods for experiments 1–6 and mentions two additional robustness experiments (SI-A and SI-B).
- Samples were recruited online, mostly from Prolific, with UK residents in each study; sample sizes were 301, 481, 414, 497, 802, and 873 (after exclusions) for experiments 1–6, respectively.
- The core design compared negative versus positive verbal probability framings of climate projections, sometimes adding a likely-frame or numerical probability frame, and measured probability translation, outcome focus, perceived consensus, evidence strength, concerns, and related judgments using ANOVA, chi-square tests, and independent t-tests.
## Limitations
- The paper states that effects on perceived consensus and scientific evidence were weaker or absent when projected values exceeded participants’ prior expectations, and it recommends further research to test generalization to climate scientists and policy-makers.
- The authors note context dependence: effects were smaller for some precipitation projections and one scenario in experiment 6, suggesting wording effects are not uniform across climate outcomes or belief conditions.
- Evident from the text: the studies used UK online samples, so generalizability beyond UK adults and Prolific-based recruitment is not directly tested in the paper.
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“judge them as less evidence-based than their positive counterparts”
plainstates an associationn = 4,150- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
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In the paper
“Across eight preregistered experiments ( N = 4,150), we find that participants perceive outcomes described with negative low probability terms as reflecting lower scientific consensus than probabilistically equivalent but positively framed terms.”
- Also stated in: § Negative verbal probabilities undermine communication of climate science · boosted
“In eight experiments, we demonstrate that the IPCC negative uncertainty terminology inadvertently undermines the perception of scientific consensus, relative to a positive uncertainty terminology”
boostedstates a causen = 4,150- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
- Also stated in: § Negative verbal probabilities undermine communication of climate science · boosted
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“although it weakens when the projected values exceeded participants' personal expectations”
plainstates a causen = 4,150- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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In the paper
“The results show that, as expected, all four verbal probabilities were estimated to indicate probabilities in the 10-30% range, peaking around 15-20% (Table 1).”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Participants also associate negative low-probability terms more strongly with extreme outcomes”
boostedstates an associationn = 4,150- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Statistics recomputed
Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.
- ConsistentF(3, 300) = 2.16reported p = .093 · recomputed p = .093
“F (3, 300) = 2.16, p = .093”
- Consistentχ²(6) = 21.12reported p = .002 · recomputed p = .002
“χ 2 (6) = 21.12, p = .002”
- Consistentt(479) = 3.04reported p = .003 · recomputed p = .002
“t (479) = 3.04, p = .003”
- Consistentt(412) = 2.18reported p = .03 · recomputed p = .030
“t (412) = 2.18, p = .030”
- Consistentt(412) = -1.62reported p = .107 · recomputed p = .106
“t (412) = -1.62, p = .107”
1 more recomputed test
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Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Method experiment 1
“accompanied by the IPCC Figure SPM.6 sea-level rise projections 48 shown in Extended Data Fig. 1.”
§ Additional information
“The figure shows on the left-hand side the projected sea level rise IPCC Figure SPM.9 (ref. 10)”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Discussion
“are believed to be less based on solid scientific evidence (experiments 2, 3 and 5) than the same projections expressed in positive, affirmative terms.”
§ Positive terms and numerical ones raise perceived consensus
“Participants evaluated consensus (out of 100 scientists), attention focus (occurrence vs non-occurrence) and degree of concern.”
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Cited by
Feeling the unseen: Clear air turbulence as a window into climate communication challenges
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Juanchich, M., Teigen, K. H., Shepherd, T. G., & Sirota, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Essex (GB)
- University of Oslo (NO)
- University of Reading (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Juanchich, Marie
- Venue
- Nature Climate Change
- Published
- 2025-11-06
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 1300-1306
- ISSN
- 1758-678X (ISSN-L)
- 1758-6798
- OpenAlex
- W4415955284
- Cited by
- 2
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2
- FWCI
- 3.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Nature Climate Change (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Open Access at Essex (University of Essex) (acceptedVersion)
- CentAUR (University of Reading) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Climate Change Communication and Perception
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Risk Perception and Management
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
- Keywords
- climate science communication, uncertainty communication, framing effects, climate change perception, extreme outcomes
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