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Like-minded sources on Facebook are prevalent but not polarizing
Open accessAbstract
Many critics raise concerns about the prevalence of ‘echo chambers’ on social media and their potential role in increasing political polarization. However, the lack of available data and the challenges of conducting large-scale field experiments have made it difficult to assess the scope of the problem. Here we present data from 2020 for the entire population of active adult Facebook users in the USA showing that content from ‘like-minded’ sources constitutes the majority of what people see on the platform, although political information and news represent only a small fraction of these exposures. To evaluate a potential response to concerns about the effects of echo chambers, we conducted a multi-wave field experiment on Facebook among 23,377 users for whom we reduced exposure to content from like-minded sources during the 2020 US presidential election by about one-third. We found that the intervention increased their exposure to content from cross-cutting sources and decreased exposure to uncivil language, but had no measurable effects on eight preregistered attitudinal measures such as affective polarization, ideological extremity, candidate evaluations and belief in false claims. These precisely estimated results suggest that although exposure to content from like-minded sources on social media is common, reducing its prevalence during the 2020 US presidential election did not correspondingly reduce polarization in beliefs or attitudes.
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CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
The paper shows that most Facebook content seen by active adult U.S. users comes from politically like-minded sources, but a three-month field experiment reducing such exposure by about one-third did not measurably change political attitudes. The intervention changed what people saw and engaged with on-platform, but not eight preregistered measures such as affective polarization or ideological extremity.
## Key findings
- Among active adult Facebook users in the U.S., the median user received 50.4% of exposures from like-minded sources and 14.7% from cross-cutting sources; civic content and news were a small share of the feed, with medians of 6.9% and 6.7%, respectively.
- In the experiment with 23,377 U.S.-based adult Facebook users, exposure to like-minded sources fell from 53.7% in control to 36.2% in treatment during 24 September to 23 December 2020; the reduction was 0.77 s.d. and total views per day declined by 0.05 s.d.
- The intervention reduced exposure to uncivil content by 0.15 s.d. and to content from misinformation repeat offenders by 0.10 s.d.; it also reduced exposure to slur-word content by 0.04 s.d.
- Despite these exposure changes, the paper reports no measurable effects on 8 preregistered attitudinal outcomes; 7 of 8 primary estimates were ±0.03 s.d. or less, and the paper says effects of ±0.12 s.d. or more can be ruled out.
## Methods
- The paper combines a descriptive analysis of exposure among the population of U.S. adult Facebook users with a multi-wave field experiment among consenting users recruited via Facebook feed survey invitations.
- The experiment used block randomization with equal probability to treatment/control; the final sample for the experiment was 23,377 participants, and surveys were fielded before and after the 2020 U.S. presidential election.
- Treatment downranked all content from friends, Pages, and groups predicted to share the participant’s political leaning; analyses used OLS with robust standard errors, preregistered covariates selected by LASSO, and survey weights for attitude estimates.
## Limitations
- The paper states it does not directly measure the slant of the content shared, only the estimated political leaning of users, Pages, and groups.
- The paper says it cannot capture effects of prior Facebook use or cumulative effects over years, and it calls for longer experiments and studies of new users.
- Evident from the text: the experiment was conducted during the 2020 presidential election and only on consenting Facebook users, so generalization beyond this setting and population is limited; the paper itself notes that replications in other countries are needed.
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In the paper
“a majority of the content that active adult Facebook users in the US see on the platform comes from politically like-minded friends or from Pages or groups with like-minded audiences (mirroring patterns of homophily in real-world networks15,39)”
§ Like-minded sources on Facebook are prevalent but not polarizing > Main > Discussion
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [15] Gentzkow, M. & Shapiro, J. M. Ideological segregation online and offline. Q. J. Econ. 126, 1799–1839 (2011). source
The citation is attached to the parenthetical comparison with real-world networks, not the preceding estimate about Facebook content. The Introduction reports ideological segregation in offline networks formed through associations, work, neighborhoods, family, and trusted friends. The paper does not provide the Facebook estimate, but that estimate is not the part this citation is offered to support. (LLM, conf=0.90)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [39] McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L. & Cook, J. M. Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks. Annu. Rev. Sociol. 27, 415–444 (2001). source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“social media consumption represents a small fraction of most people’s information diets37”
§ Like-minded sources on Facebook are prevalent but not polarizing > Main > Discussion
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [37] Allen, J., Howland, B., Mobius, M., Rothschild, D. & Watts, D. J. Evaluating the fake news problem at the scale of the information ecosystem. Sci. Adv. 6, eaay3539 (2020). sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results report that online news, including exposure on social media, is a small share of media consumption; the Discussion says TV news consumption exceeds online news consumption by 5:1, with an even larger gap for social media sites. Those findings concern news consumed through social media, not all social media consumption. The cited passages also do not establish the claim for most individuals rather than aggregate consumption. (LLM, conf=0.82)
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In the paper
“Without access to behavioural measures of exposure, studies must instead rely on survey self-reports that are prone to measurement error24,25.”
§ Like-minded sources on Facebook are prevalent but not polarizing > Main
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [24] Prior, M. The immensely inflated news audience: Assessing bias in self-reported news exposure. Public Opin. Q. 73, 130–143 (2009). source
- Supportedcites [25] Konitzer, T. et al. Comparing estimates of news consumption from survey and passively collected behavioral data. Public Opin. Q. 85, 347–370 (2021). source
The Introduction (page not specified) says researchers commonly rely on surveys to measure news consumption and that self-reports can suffer measurement error from memory decay, inaccurate estimates, and social desirability bias. This supports the claim about reliance on error-prone self-reports when behavioral measures are unavailable. (LLM, conf=0.90)
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A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“the median Facebook user received a majority of their content from like-minded sources—50.4% versus 14.7% from cross-cutting sources”
§ Like-minded sources on Facebook are prevalent but not polarizing > Main > Exposure to like-minded sources
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, the intervention only modestly increases exposure to content from cross-cutting sources.”
§ Like-minded sources on Facebook are prevalent but not polarizing > Main
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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In the citing paper
“On the other hand, other research has failed to find long-term changes in user beliefs due to social media ranking algorithms [26,27,29,38]”
From Twitter's Algorithm: Amplifying Anger, Animosity, and Affective Polarization (2023) · cites this paper as [38]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“That said, other work, specifically on Facebook, offers a more ambiguous portrait.While some evidence suggests it contributes to issue polarization (Allcott et al., 2020;Settle, 2018), other shows it has no effect on ideological extremity, affective polarization, or belief in false claims (Nyhan et al., 2023; also see Guess et al., 2023aGuess et al., , 2023b).”
From How to study democratic backsliding (2024) · cites this paper as Nyhan et al., 2023
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“For instance, Nordbrandt [76], Nyhan et al. [77] observed that while social media usage does not directly influence affective polarization-the individuals' sympathy or antipathy toward specific political parties-prior patterns of social media engagement can shape this relationship.”
From A systematic review of echo chamber research: comparative analysis of conceptualizations, operationalizations, and varying outcomes (2025) · cites this paper as [77]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Similarly, recent large-scale experiments on Facebook and Instagram found no evidence that reduced exposure to in-party sources or a simpler reverse-chronological algorithm affected polarization and political attitudes (37,23) during the 2020 U.S. election.”
From Reranking partisan animosity in algorithmic social media feeds alters affective polarization (2025) · cites this paper as [23]
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Since we did not preregister this analysis, we minimize the number of subjective modeling decisions by considering the same participant characteristics and following a similar reweighting procedure as the Facebook and Instagram Election studies (23,37).”
From Reranking partisan animosity in algorithmic social media feeds alters affective polarization (2025) · cites this paper as [23]
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Citations
Cites
Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks
McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. M. (2001) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.415 · Cited by 18,567 · cited 1×
“However, a majority of the content that active adult Facebook users in the US see on the platform comes from politically like-minded friends or from Pages or groups with like-minded audiences (mirroring patterns of homophily in real-world networks 15,39 ).”
BackgroundThe Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States
Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034 · Cited by 3,603
Self-citationExposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook
Bakshy, E., Messing, S., & Adamic, L. A. (2015) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aaa1160 · Cited by 3,245 · cited 1×
“Prior observational studies of information exposure on platforms focus on Twitter, which is used by only 23% of the public 19–22 , or the news diet of the small minority of active adult users in the US who self-identified as conservative or liberal on Facebook in 2014–2015 23 .”
BackgroundFilter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online News Consumption
Flaxman, S., Goel, S., & Rao, J. M. (2016) · Public Opinion Quarterly · doi:10.1093/poq/nfw006 · Cited by 1,992
FILTER BUBBLE: Wie wir im Internet entmündigt werden
Pariser, E. (2012) · doi:10.3139/9783446431164 · Cited by 1,849
Tweeting From Left to Right: Is Online Political Communication More Than an Echo Chamber?
Barberá, P., Jost, J. T., Nagler, J., Tucker, J. A., & Bonneau, R. (2015) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797615594620 · Cited by 1,472
Polarization and Partisan Selective Exposure
Stroud, N. J. (2010) · Journal of Communication · doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01497.x · Cited by 1,346
Self-citationCross-cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice
MUTZ, D. C. (2002) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055402004264 · Cited by 1,069
Ideological Segregation Online and Offline *
Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. M. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr044 · Cited by 980
Self-citationPolitical Sectarianism in America
Finkel, E. J., Bail, C. A., Cikara, M., Ditto, P. H., Iyengar, S., Klar, S., Mason, L., McGrath, M. C., Nyhan, B., Rand, D. G., et al. (2020) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.abe1715 · Cited by 931
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Sunstein, C. R. Republic.com 2.0 (Princeton Univ. Press, 2009).
- Wojcieszak, M. et al. No polarization from partisan news. Int. J. Press/Politics https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161221104 (2021). · doi:10.1177/1940161221104
Cited by
Misunderstanding the harms of online misinformation
Budak, C., Nyhan, B., Rothschild, D. M., Thorson, E., & Watts, D. J. (2024) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-024-07417-w · Cited by 156
“Experiments varying individual features of the platform have also yielded mixed results: although increasing exposure to cross-cutting news decreased affective polarization 94 , decreasing exposure to content from like-minded sources had no effect 44 .”
InfluentialSelf-citationQuantifying the impact of misinformation and vaccine-skeptical content on Facebook
Allen, J. N. L., Watts, D. J., & Rand, D. G. (2024) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.adk3451 · Cited by 244
“…sharing of and belief in falsehoods ( 12 – 15 ), consideration of the real-world impact of exposure to misinformation [as opposed to impacts of larger algorithmic changes to platforms ( 16 – 18 )] has been largely relegated to assertions in introductory paragraphs and discussion sections ( 19 ).”
Building Human Values into Recommender Systems: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis
Stray, J., Halevy, A. Y., Assar, P., Hadfield-Menell, D., Boutilier, C. E., Ashar, A., Bakalar, C., Beattie, L., Ekstrand, M. D., Leibowicz, C., et al. (2023) · ACM Transactions on Recommender Systems · doi:10.1145/3632297 · Cited by 219
Persistent interaction patterns across social media platforms and over time
Avalle, M., Marco, N. D., Etta, G., Sangiorgio, E., Alipour, S., Bonetti, A., Alvisi, L., Scala, A., Baronchelli, A., Cinelli, M., et al. (2024) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-024-07229-y · Cited by 219
“Consistent with previous studies 36,37 our analysis shows that the macroscopic patterns of online conversations, such as the distribution of users/threads activity and lifetime, are consistent across all data-sets and topics (Supplementary Tables 1–4).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialThe Polarizing Effect of Partisan Echo Chambers
HOBOLT, S. B., Lawall, K., & Tilley, J. R. (2023) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055423001211 · Cited by 148
“Some find that exposure to political views, and even partisan echo chambers, on social media does not have polarizing effects (Nyhan et al. 2023; Suhay, Bello-Pardo, and Maurer 2018), while others argue that social media usage increases perceptions of differences between partisan groups in ways…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Nyhan, B., Settle, J., Thorson, E., Wojcieszak, M., Barberá, P., Chen, A. Y., Allcott, H., Brown, T., Crespo-Tenorio, A., Dimmery, D., Freelon, D., Gentzkow, M., González-Bailón, S., Guess, A. M., Kennedy, E., Kim, Y. M., Lazer, D., Malhotra, N., Moehler, D., Pan, J., Thomas, D. R., Tromble, R., Rivera, C. V., Wilkins, A., Xiong, B., de Jonge, C. K., Franco, A., Mason, W., Stroud, N. J., & Tucker, J. A.
- Affiliations
- Dartmouth College (US)
- William & Mary (US)
- Syracuse University (US)
- University of California, Davis (US)
- Meta (United States) (US)
- City University of New York (US)
- Stanford University (US)
- University of Vienna (AT)
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
- Princeton University (US)
- Carnegie Mellon University (US)
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- Northeastern University (US)
- George Washington University (US)
- Center for Media Engagement (US)
- New York University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nyhan, Brendan
- ORCID
- Nyhan, Brendan
- Settle, Jaime
- Thorson, Emily
- Wojcieszak, Magdalena
- Barberá, Pablo
- Chen, Annie Y.
- Brown, Taylor
- Dimmery, Drew
- Freelon, Deen
- Gentzkow, Matthew
- González-Bailón, Sandra
- Guess, Andrew M.
- Kennedy, Edward
- Kim, Young Mie
- Lazer, David
- Malhotra, Neil
- Moehler, Devra
- Pan, Jennifer
- Thomas, Daniel Robert
- Tromble, Rebekah
- Wilkins, Arjun
- Mason, Winter
- Stroud, Natalie Jomini
- Tucker, Joshua A.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2023-07-27
- Volume
- 620
- Issue
- 7972
- Pages
- 137-144
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- PMC
- PMC10396953
- OpenAlex
- W4385325063
- Cited by
- 333
- References
- 41
- Citations by year
- 2026: 115 · 2025: 100 · 2024: 96 · 2023: 21
- FWCI
- 156.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Update notices
- correction (2023-11-01)
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
- John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation
- John S. and James L. Knight Foundation
- University of Wisconsin-Madison
- Charles Koch Foundation
- York University
- Nutrition Obesity Research Center, University of North Carolina
- Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Keywords
- echo chambers, political polarization, Facebook, content exposure, 2020 US presidential election, field experiments, affective polarization, ideological extremity, candidate evaluation, social media
- MeSH terms
- Disinformation, Adult, Attitude, Emotions, Humans, Language, Politics, United States, Social Media
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- Nyhan, B., Settle, J., Thorson, E., Wojcieszak, M., Barberá, P., Chen, A. Y., Allcott, H., Brown, T., Crespo-Tenorio, A., Dimmery, D., Freelon, D., Gentzkow, M., González-Bailón, S., Guess, A. M., Kennedy, E., Kim, Y. M., Lazer, D., Malhotra, N., Moehler, D., . . . Tucker, J. A. (2023). Like-minded sources on Facebook are prevalent but not polarizing. Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-023-06297-w
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