The DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 56 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Causal reductionism and causal structures
Abstract
Causal reductionism is the widespread assumption that there is no room for additional causes once we have accounted for all elementary mechanisms within a system. Due to its intuitive appeal, causal reductionism is prevalent in neuroscience: once all neurons have been caused to fire or not to fire, it seems that causally there is nothing left to be accounted for. Here, we argue that these reductionist intuitions are based on an implicit, unexamined notion of causation that conflates causation with prediction. By means of a simple model organism, we demonstrate that causal reductionism cannot provide a complete and coherent account of 'what caused what'. To that end, we outline an explicit, operational approach to analyzing causal structures.
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“However, to account for the structure of experience, considering only the cause–effect power of the individual units or of the system as a whole would be insufficient [17, 29].”
From Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms (2023) · cites this paper as [17]
In the citing paper
“However, from the intrinsic perspective of the system causes and effects that are excluded from its cause–effect structure do not exist [17, 29].”
From Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms (2023) · cites this paper as [17]
Citations
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“In summary, causal structure analysis reveals that, in the maximally activated state: (i) a stronger cause can be found at the grain of macro-units, compared to micro-units (cause (1) > (2)); (ii) a macro time step can also result in higher causal strength compared to micro-intervals (cause of (3) > (4)); and (iii) re…”
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Cited by
Albantakis, L., Barbosa, L., Findlay, G., Grasso, M., Haun, A. M., Marshall, W., Mayner, W. G. P., Zaeemzadeh, A., Boly, M., Juel, B. E., et al. (2023) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011465 · Cited by 292
“However, from the intrinsic perspective of the system causes and effects that are excluded from its cause–effect structure do not exist [20,36].”
Self-citationIs Target-Based Drug Discovery Efficient? Discovery and “Off-Target” Mechanisms of All Drugs
Sadri, A. (2023) · Journal of Medicinal Chemistry · doi:10.1021/acs.jmedchem.2c01737 · Cited by 162
Classic Psychedelic Drugs: Update on Biological Mechanisms
Vollenweider, F. X., & Smallridge, J. W. (2022) · Pharmacopsychiatry · doi:10.1055/a-1721-2914 · Cited by 128
Genuine high-order interactions in brain networks and neurodegeneration
Herzog, R. A., Rosas, F. E., Whelan, R., Fittipaldi, S., Santamaría‐García, H. A., Cruzat, J., Birba, A., Moguilner, S., Tagliazucchi, E., Prado, P., et al. (2022) · Neurobiology of Disease · doi:10.1016/j.nbd.2022.105918 · Cited by 135
The brain's best kept secret is its degenerate structure
Albantakis, L., Bernard, C., Brenner, N., Marder, E., & Narayanan, R. (2024) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.1339-24.2024 · Cited by 34
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Metadata
- Authors
- Grasso, M., Albantakis, L., Lang, J. P., & Tononi, G.
- Affiliations
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- Corresponding author
- Tononi, Giulio
- Venue
- Nature Neuroscience
- Published
- 2021-09-23
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 1348-1355
- ISSN
- 1097-6256 (ISSN-L)
- 1546-1726
- OpenAlex
- W3199147584
- Cited by
- 42
- References
- 56
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 8
- FWCI
- 6.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (vor)
- Locations
- Nature Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Templeton World Charity Foundation (0216, 0526, TWCF0216)
- Tiny Blue Dot Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- causal structure, causality, prediction, causal inference
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Anura, Forecasting, Neurons, Neurosciences, Philosophy, Species Specificity, Causality
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Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Causal reductionism and causal structures. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1038/s41593-021-00911-8
- The paper
- Grasso, M., Albantakis, L., Lang, J. P., & Tononi, G. (2021). Causal reductionism and causal structures. Nature Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41593-021-00911-8
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.