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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 56 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Causal reductionism and causal structures

Abstract

Causal reductionism is the widespread assumption that there is no room for additional causes once we have accounted for all elementary mechanisms within a system. Due to its intuitive appeal, causal reductionism is prevalent in neuroscience: once all neurons have been caused to fire or not to fire, it seems that causally there is nothing left to be accounted for. Here, we argue that these reductionist intuitions are based on an implicit, unexamined notion of causation that conflates causation with prediction. By means of a simple model organism, we demonstrate that causal reductionism cannot provide a complete and coherent account of 'what caused what'. To that end, we outline an explicit, operational approach to analyzing causal structures.

Overview

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1038/s41593-021-00911-8

Cites

54 of 54 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 56 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Pearl, J. Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference (Cambridge University Press, 2000). Seminal contribution introducing a causal calculus—a formal framework to evaluate interventions in causal Bayesian networks. The book also offers an overview over methods for ‘causal inference’—how to define a causal model from sparse data. While causal structure analysis makes use of interventions and causal Bayesian networks, it is not concerned with causal inference.
  2. Davidson, D. Mental events. In Readings in Philosophy of Psychology (ed. Block, N.) 107–119 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1980).

Cited by

See all 43

Metadata

Authors
Grasso, M., Albantakis, L., Lang, J. P., & Tononi, G.
Affiliations
University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
Corresponding author
Tononi, Giulio
Venue
Nature Neuroscience
Published
2021-09-23
Volume
24
Issue
10
Pages
1348-1355
ISSN
  • 1097-6256 (ISSN-L)
  • 1546-1726
OpenAlex
W3199147584
Cited by
42
References
56
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 8
FWCI
6.13
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
Locations
  • Nature Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • Templeton World Charity Foundation (0216, 0526, TWCF0216)
  • Tiny Blue Dot Foundation
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
causal structure, causality, prediction, causal inference
MeSH terms
Animals, Anura, Forecasting, Neurons, Neurosciences, Philosophy, Species Specificity, Causality

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Causal reductionism and causal structures. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1038/s41593-021-00911-8
The paper
Grasso, M., Albantakis, L., Lang, J. P., & Tononi, G. (2021). Causal reductionism and causal structures. Nature Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41593-021-00911-8

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.