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From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0
Open accessAbstract
This paper presents Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness 3.0, which incorporates several advances over previous formulations. IIT starts from phenomenological axioms: information says that each experience is specific--it is what it is by how it differs from alternative experiences; integration says that it is unified--irreducible to non-interdependent components; exclusion says that it has unique borders and a particular spatio-temporal grain. These axioms are formalized into postulates that prescribe how physical mechanisms, such as neurons or logic gates, must be configured to generate experience (phenomenology). The postulates are used to define intrinsic information as "differences that make a difference" within a system, and integrated information as information specified by a whole that cannot be reduced to that specified by its parts. By applying the postulates both at the level of individual mechanisms and at the level of systems of mechanisms, IIT arrives at an identity: an experience is a maximally irreducible conceptual structure (MICS, a constellation of concepts in qualia space), and the set of elements that generates it constitutes a complex. According to IIT, a MICS specifies the quality of an experience and integrated information ΦMax its quantity. From the theory follow several results, including: a system of mechanisms may condense into a major complex and non-overlapping minor complexes; the concepts that specify the quality of an experience are always about the complex itself and relate only indirectly to the external environment; anatomical connectivity influences complexes and associated MICS; a complex can generate a MICS even if its elements are inactive; simple systems can be minimally conscious; complicated systems can be unconscious; there can be true "zombies"--unconscious feed-forward systems that are functionally equivalent to conscious complexes.
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“It is important to emphasize that the absolute or isolated value of any IIT estimate lacks intrinsic meaning.”
From Can "consciousness" be observed from large language model (LLM) internal states? Dissecting LLM representations obtained from Theory of Mind test with Integrated Information Theory and Span Representation analysis (2025) · cites this paper as Oizumi et al., 2014
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In the citing paper
“Proponents of the theory accept that two recurrently connected neurons are indeed conscious and accept panpsychism (Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi & Koch, 2015).”
From Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness (2021) · cites this paper as Oizumi et al., 2014
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“However, for many de fi nitions of complexity, even very small networks with less than 10 neurons exhibit high complexity (Herzog et al., 2007; Oizumi et al., 2014).”
From Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness (2021) · cites this paper as Oizumi et al., 2014
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“(4) Finally, modular or feedforward architectures, such as deep learning networks, would not be conscious even if their observable performance should equal that of a conscious human.94”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [94]
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In the citing paper
“IIT defines a property of a system called integrated information (Φ) and postulates that this is an exact measure of the quantity of consciousness of any system.”
From The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory (2015) · cites this paper as [8]
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Cited by
Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate
Tononi, G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., & Koch, C. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.44 · Cited by 1,727
Self-citationNeural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems
Koch, C., Massimini, M., Boly, M., & Tononi, G. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.22 · Cited by 1,600
Self-citationConscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis
Mashour, G. A., Roelfsema, P., Changeux, J.-P., & Dehaene, S. (2020) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2020.01.026 · Cited by 1,164
Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4 · Cited by 880
Consciousness: here, there and everywhere?
Tononi, G., & Koch, C. (2015) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2014.0167 · Cited by 811
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Metadata
- Authors
- Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G.
- Affiliations
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- Corresponding author
- Tononi, Giulio
- Venue
- PLoS Computational Biology
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2014-05-08
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- e1003588
- ISSN
- 1553-734X (ISSN-L)
- 1553-7358
- PMC
- PMC4014402
- OpenAlex
- W1969469858
- Cited by
- 1,128
- References
- 77
- Citations by year
- 2026: 83 · 2025: 79 · 2024: 106 · 2023: 124 · 2022: 118 · 2021: 132 · 2020: 87 · 2019: 129 · 2018: 98 · 2017: 68 · 2016: 51 · 2015: 44 · 2014: 8
- FWCI
- 79.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- PLoS Computational Biology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- James S. McDonnell Foundation
- Templeton World Charity Foundation
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (26870860)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- integrated information theory, consciousness, phenomenology, intrinsic information, integrated information, qualia, structural connectivity, minimally conscious state, neural mechanisms of consciousness
- MeSH terms
- Action Potentials, Animals, Brain, Computer Simulation, Consciousness, Humans, Information Theory, Models, Neurological, Nerve Net, Synaptic Transmission, Neurons
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