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Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms
Open accessAbstract
This paper presents Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 4.0. IIT aims to account for the properties of experience in physical (operational) terms. It identifies the essential properties of experience (axioms), infers the necessary and sufficient properties that its substrate must satisfy (postulates), and expresses them in mathematical terms. In principle, the postulates can be applied to any system of units in a state to determine whether it is conscious, to what degree, and in what way. IIT offers a parsimonious explanation of empirical evidence, makes testable predictions concerning both the presence and the quality of experience, and permits inferences and extrapolations. IIT 4.0 incorporates several developments of the past ten years, including a more accurate formulation of the axioms as postulates and mathematical expressions, the introduction of a unique measure of intrinsic information that is consistent with the postulates, and an explicit assessment of causal relations. By fully unfolding a system's irreducible cause-effect power, the distinctions and relations specified by a substrate can account for the quality of experience.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
This paper presents IIT 4.0, a mathematical framework that defines consciousness as a substrate’s intrinsic cause–effect power, characterized by a maximal substrate (a complex) and its unfolded Φ-structure. Using simple example networks, the authors illustrate how connectivity, state, and architecture determine whether a system can support consciousness and what kind of experience it specifies.
## Key findings
- IIT 4.0 formalizes five phenomenal axioms as physical postulates: existence, intrinsicality, information, integration, exclusion, and composition; a conscious substrate must take and make a difference within itself, be specific, irreducible, definite, and structured.
- In example networks, bottlenecks and degeneracy keep complexes small and Φ low, while weakly connected modules split into separate complexes; for the 6-unit copy cycle, the paper reports a maximal φs = 1.74 ibits but low Φ = 7.65 because the Φ-structure contains only first-order distinctions.
- A specialized 6-unit lattice produced 27 distinctions out of 63 possible distinctions, yielding a much richer Φ-structure than the copy cycle.
- In the activity example, changing one unit’s state altered the Φ-structure substantially; when a unit was inactivated rather than merely inactive, its compound Φ-fold collapsed and the complex shrank.
- In the functional equivalence example, three systems with the same input–output function and equivalent global dynamics nonetheless had different Φ-structures: one had Φ = 21.01 ibits, another had Φ = 3.64 ibits, and the third was reducible with φs = 0 ibits.
## Methods
- The paper develops a mathematical formalism for IIT 4.0 based on a substrate’s transition probability matrix (TPM), then applies it to idealized binary networks in the Results and discussion.
- It identifies maximal cause–effect states using intrinsic information, then computes system integrated information (φs) via minimum partitions (MIPs), selects maximal substrates (complexes) by maximal φs, and unfolds cause–effect structures into distinctions and relations to obtain Φ.
- The worked examples use simple simulated systems of 5–6 binary units, analyzed with the “iit-4.0” feature branch of PyPhi.
## Limitations
- The authors state that a full analysis of complexes and their cause–effect structure is not feasible for realistic systems because exhaustive observations, manipulations, and calculations face multiple nested combinatorial explosions.
- They note that the framework is illustrated on extremely simple, simulated networks rather than actual substrates, so the examples are explanatory demonstrations rather than empirical analyses.
- They explicitly say IIT 4.0 is “work in progress,” and that some algorithmic choices remain open to further evaluation, including treatment of background conditions and tie resolution under TPM symmetries.
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42 Valid · 6 Not valid · 11 Not checked · 195 Own results and interpretations
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In the paper
“Moreover, if the background conditions are well controlled, neurons are thought to interact in a highly reliable, nearly deterministic manner [41–43].”
§ Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms > Results and discussion > Consciousness and connectivity
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [41] ZF Mainen, 1995, Reliability of spike timing in neocortical neurons, Science source
- Partly supportedcites [42] SA Hires, 2015, Low-noise encoding of active touch by layer 4 in the somatosensory cortex, eLife sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction (page unavailable) says that accounting for hidden states and uncontrolled factors may reveal cortical spike trains to be deterministic and predictable. That supports the qualified idea that controlled conditions can reveal reliable spiking, but the paper does not establish that neurons generally interact in a nearly deterministic manner; its measurements concern layer 4 neurons during active touch. (LLM, conf=0.82)
- Disputedcites [43] M Nolte, 2019, Cortical reliability amid noise and chaos, Nature Communications sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction (page unavailable) describes the nearly deterministic view but then challenges it: even in tightly controlled in-vitro conditions, synaptic release is unreliable, so neurons respond less reliably to presynaptic inputs than to current injections. The paper reports highly reliable network responses under particular input conditions, not reliable interactions merely because background conditions are controlled. (LLM, conf=0.86)
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hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“This is a measure of the difference between two probability distributions which uniquely satisfies three properties (causality, intrinsicality, and specificity) that align with the postulates of IIT (but also have independent justification):”
§ Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms > Identifying substrates of consciousness > Existence, intrinsicality, and information: Determining the maximal cause–effect state of a candidate system
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [14] LS Barbosa, 2020, A measure for intrinsic information, Scientific Reports sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results and discussion and Conclusion state that intrinsic difference (ID) captures a difference between probability distributions and is uniquely characterized by causality, specificity, and intrinsicality. The Introduction explains those properties, but the passages in our copy do not establish the additional claim that they align with IIT's postulates. (LLM, conf=0.84)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“However, to account for the structure of experience, considering only the cause–effect power of the individual units or of the system as a whole would be insufficient [17, 29].”
§ Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms > Overview of IIT’s framework > Implementing the postulates
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [17] M Grasso, 2021, Causal reductionism and causal structures, Nature Neuroscience source
- Supportedcites [29] L Albantakis, 2019, Causal Composition: Structural Differences among Dynamically Equivalent Systems, Entropy 2019, Vol 21, Page 989 source
Section 4.3 explains that a holistic account of visual experience misses its distinct spots and their relations, while a reductionist account of individual spots misses how they compose an extended scene. It also says that a system’s compositional cause–effect structure is needed to characterize the structure of phenomenal experience. Page numbers are not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.94)
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Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Because consciousness is the way it is, the formulation of its properties in physical, operational terms should be unique and based on quantities that uniquely satisfy the postulates [12, 32].”
§ Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms > Identifying substrates of consciousness > Existence, intrinsicality, and information: Determining the maximal cause–effect state of a candidate system
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [12] LS Barbosa, 2021, Mechanism Integrated Information, Entropy source
The Introduction says IIT translates properties of consciousness into physical postulates with a mathematical formulation. The Discussion says that, because the quantity and quality of consciousness cannot vary with an arbitrary choice of measure, a unique measure of intrinsic information based on the postulates is a critical requirement. This supports the cited principle, specifically as applied to that measure. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Supportedcites [32] AB Barrett, 2019, The phi measure of integrated information is not well-defined for general physical systems, Journal of Consciousness Studies source
The Abstract (p. 1) says that, for IIT’s account of consciousness to be plausible, there should be no alternative formulae for Φ consistent with its axioms. The Introduction (p. 1) describes Φ as a proposed fundamental physical quantity. Together, these support the citing sentence’s claim about a unique physical formulation, though the paper argues that the current Φ does not yet meet that standard. (LLM, conf=0.89)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
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The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Selectivity means that if p < 1, the system’s causal power becomes subadditive (dilution) (see [14] for details).”
§ Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms > Identifying substrates of consciousness > Existence, intrinsicality, and information: Determining the maximal cause–effect state of a candidate system
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [14] LS Barbosa, 2020, A measure for intrinsic information, Scientific Reports sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Theory section says that adding a fully noisy independent channel dilutes intrinsic information and makes the measure sub-additive. Results and discussion specifies sub-additivity for some independent noisy distributions, not a general rule whenever p < 1; it attributes this behavior to intrinsicality rather than selectivity. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
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In the citing paper
“It is important to emphasize that the absolute or isolated value of any IIT estimate lacks intrinsic meaning.”
From Can "consciousness" be observed from large language model (LLM) internal states? Dissecting LLM representations obtained from Theory of Mind test with Integrated Information Theory and Span Representation analysis (2025) · cites this paper as Albantakis et al., 2023
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Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“IIT also makes several experimental predictions that have been validated in humans”
From Dissociating Artificial Intelligence from Artificial Consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [19]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“IIT is supported by growing scientific evidence about our own consciousness.For example, IIT provides a selfconsistent account of why the cerebral cortex is important for consciousness but the cerebellum is not, despite having four times more neurons; why consciousness fades in deep slowwave sleep, even though cortical neurons remain active; and why consciousness might have evolved”
From Dissociating Artificial Intelligence from Artificial Consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [19]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“IIT holds that a maximal F value will be reached primarily in posterior cortex (''hot zone'') 78,95 when dense reentrant interactions occur between higher and lower visual areas.7”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [95]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Based on how F is calculated to ''quantify'' PC, artificial systems with purely feedforward architecture have F = 0, and hence lack consciousness (PC), even when their overt behaviors (input-output functions) are indistinguishable from that of conscious (F > 0) systems with feedback 94,95 (but see Doerig et al. 155 ).”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [95]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
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Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Causality: models, reasoning, and inference
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.38-1494a · Cited by 2,873
An information integration theory of consciousness
Tononi, G. (2004) · BMC Neuroscience · doi:10.1186/1471-2202-5-42 · Cited by 1,958
Self-citationReliability of spike timing in neocortical neurons
Mainen, Z. F., & Sejnowski, T. J. (1995) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7770778 · Cited by 1,950
Basal ganglia and cerebellar loops: motor and cognitive circuits
Middleton, F. (2000) · Brain Research Reviews · doi:10.1016/s0165-0173(99)00040-5 · Cited by 1,940 · cited 1×
“) The brain is rich in partially segregated, directed cycles, such as those originating in cortical areas, sequentially reaching stations in the basal ganglia and thalamus, and cycling back to cortex [57,58].”
Steriade, M., Nunez, A., & Amzica, F. (1993) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.13-08-03252.1993 · Cited by 1,903 · cited 1×
“This bistability, brought about by neuromodulatory changes [55], is associated with the loss of consciousness [56].”
Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate
Tononi, G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., & Koch, C. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.44 · Cited by 1,727 · cited 10×
“These cycles are critical for carrying out many cognitive and other functions, but they do not appear to contribute directly to experience [7].”
InfluentialSelf-citationBreakdown of cortical effective connectivity during sleep
Massimini, M., Ferrarelli, F., Huber, R., Esser, S. K., Singh, H., & Tononi, G. (2005) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1117256 · Cited by 1,534 · cited 1×
“The postulates of IIT have been and are being applied to account for the location of the substrate of consciousness in the brain [7] and for its loss and recovery in physiological and pathological conditions [25,26].”
Self-citationFrom the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: integrated information theory 3.0
Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2014) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588 · Cited by 1,128 · cited 5×
“This is done by causally marginalizing all variables in X = S \M , which corresponds to imposing a uniform distribution as p(Xt) [11,13,15] (note [44]).”
InfluentialSelf-citationFunctional specificity in the human brain: a window into the functional architecture of the mind
Kanwisher, N. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1005062107 · Cited by 929
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Findlay G, Marshall W, Albantakis L, Mayner WGP, Koch C, Tononi G. Dissociating Intelligence from Consciousness in Artificial Systems – Implications of Integrated Information Theory. In: Proceedings of the 2019 Towards Conscious AI Systems Symposium, AAAI SSS19; 2019 and forthcoming.
- Zanardi P, Tomka M, Venuti LC. Towards Quantum Integrated Information Theory. arXiv. 2018;1806.01421.
Cited by
Cogitate Consortium, Ferrante, O., Gorska-Klimowska, U., Henin, S., Hirschhorn, R., Khalaf, A., Lepauvre, A., Liu, L., Richter, D., Vidal, Y., et al. (2025) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-025-08888-1 · Cited by 136
“Here we present an open science adversarial collaboration directly juxtaposing integrated information theory (IIT) 4,5 and global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT) 6–10 via a theory-neutral consortium 11–13 .”
Self-citationAn integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness
Storm, J. F., Klink, P. C., Aru, J., Senn, W., Goebel, R., Pigorini, A., Avanzini, P., Vanduffel, W., Roelfsema, P. R., Massimini, M., et al. (2024) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2024.02.004 · Cited by 114
Anesthesia and the neurobiology of consciousness
Mashour, G. A. (2024) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2024.03.002 · Cited by 127
An adversarial collaboration to critically evaluate theories of consciousness
Cogitate Consortium, Ferrante, O., Gorska-Klimowska, U., Henin, S., Hirschhorn, R., Khalaf, A., Lepauvre, A., Liu, L., Richter, D., Vidal, Y., et al. (2023) · doi:10.1101/2023.06.23.546249 · Cited by 86
Self-citationUnpacking the complexities of consciousness: Theories and reflections
Mudrik, L., Boly, M., Dehaene, S., Fleming, S. M., Lamme, V., Seth, A., & Melloni, L. (2025) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106053 · Cited by 81
“IIT identifies five properties that hold true for every conceivable experience (Albantakis et al., 2023).”
InfluentialSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Albantakis, L., Barbosa, L., Findlay, G., Grasso, M., Haun, A. M., Marshall, W., Mayner, W. G. P., Zaeemzadeh, A., Boly, M., Juel, B. E., Sasai, S., Fujii, K., David, I., Hendren, J., Lang, J. P., & Tononi, G.
- Affiliations
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- Corresponding author
- Tononi, Giulio
- ORCID
- Venue
- PLoS Computational Biology
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2023-10-17
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- e1011465
- ISSN
- 1553-734X (ISSN-L)
- 1553-7358
- PMC
- PMC10581496
- OpenAlex
- W4387700987
- Cited by
- 292
- References
- 67
- Citations by year
- 2026: 104 · 2025: 92 · 2024: 64 · 2023: 31
- FWCI
- 75.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- PLoS Computational Biology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
- Funders
- Templeton World Charity Foundation (TWCF0216, TWCF-2020-20526)
- Tiny Blue Dot Foundation (UW 133AAG3451)
- National Research Council Canada (RGPIN-2019-05418)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- integrated information theory, consciousness, phenomenal experience, intrinsic information, causal relationship, quality of experience
- MeSH terms
- Brain, Consciousness, Information Theory, Models, Neurological
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- Albantakis, L., Barbosa, L., Findlay, G., Grasso, M., Haun, A. M., Marshall, W., Mayner, W. G. P., Zaeemzadeh, A., Boly, M., Juel, B. E., Sasai, S., Fujii, K., David, I., Hendren, J., Lang, J. P., & Tononi, G. (2023). Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0: Formulating the properties of phenomenal existence in physical terms. PLoS Computational Biology. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011465
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