The DOI matches its Crossref record; 68 of the 71 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 23 of the 64 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Quantum-resistance in blockchain networks
Open accessAbstract
The advent of quantum computing threatens blockchain protocols and networks because they utilize non-quantum resistant cryptographic algorithms. When quantum computers become robust enough to run Shor's algorithm on a large scale, the most used asymmetric algorithms, utilized for digital signatures and message encryption, such as RSA, (EC)DSA, and (EC)DH, will be no longer secure. Quantum computers will be able to break them within a short period of time. Similarly, Grover's algorithm concedes a quadratic advantage for mining blocks in certain consensus protocols such as proof of work. Today, there are hundreds of billions of dollars denominated in cryptocurrencies and other digital assets that rely on blockchain ledgers as well as thousands of blockchain-based applications storing value in blockchain networks. Cryptocurrencies and blockchain-based applications require solutions that guarantee quantum resistance in order to preserve the integrity of data and assets in these public and immutable ledgers. The quantum threat and some potential solutions are well understood and presented in the literature. However, most proposals are theoretical, require large QKD networks, or propose new quantum-resistant blockchain networks to be built from scratch. Our work, which is presented in this paper, is pioneer in proposing an end-to-end framework for post-quantum blockchain networks that can be applied to existing blockchain to achieve quantum-resistance. We have developed an open-source implementation in an Ethereum-based (i.e., EVM compatible) network that can be extended to other existing blockchains. For the implementation we have (i) used quantum entropy to generate post-quantum key pairs, (ii) established post-quantum TLS connections and X.509 certificates to secure the exchange of information between blockchain nodes over the internet without needing a large QKD network, (iii) introduced a post-quantum second signature in transactions using Falcon-512 post-quantum keys, and (iv) developed the first on-chain verification of post-quantum signatures using three different mechanisms that are compared and analyzed: Solidity smart-contracts run by the validators for each transaction, modified EVM Opcode, and precompiled smart contracts.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
The paper proposes and implements an end-to-end framework for making existing blockchain networks quantum-resistant by combining quantum entropy, post-quantum TLS/X.509, post-quantum transaction signatures, and on-chain verification. In an EVM-compatible LACChain pilot, the authors report that their preferred verification approach adds about 22 bytes per packet, increases memory from about 150 MB to about 200 MB, and raises CPU use by 10% to 30%.
## Key findings
- The paper identifies two critical quantum-risk areas for blockchains: node-to-node communication and transaction signatures.
- It implements a 5-step framework in LACChain: quantum entropy, post-quantum certificates, post-quantum TLS tunnels, post-quantum transaction signatures, and on-chain verification.
- For communication overhead, the post-quantum channel adds a constant 22 bytes per packet.
- For the preferred verification approach, node memory rises from around 150 MB to around 200 MB, and CPU overhead is reported as 10% to 30%.
## Methods
- Design: A 5-step end-to-end post-quantum framework for blockchain networks, implemented on an EVM-compatible LACChain/Hyperledger Besu network.
- Data/sample: A pilot deployment on LACChain nodes, using Quantum Origin as the entropy source and Falcon-512 for post-quantum signatures; tests were run in Google Cloud on a virtual environment with 2 vCPUs and 7.5 GB memory.
- Analysis: The authors compare three on-chain verification mechanisms for Falcon signatures—Solidity smart contract, modified EVM opcode, and precompiled smart contract—and measure packet overhead, Java memory, and CPU consumption under classical vs post-quantum configurations.
## Limitations
- The paper states that QKD is “not scalable today” and therefore was not used as the solution; instead it relies on post-quantum cryptography and a central entropy source for the pilot.
- The Solidity on-chain verification approach is described as impractical because it needs about 500 million gas per Falcon signature verification and exceeds the 24 kb code-size limit; this is a limitation stated in the paper.
- Evident from the text: the implementation was tested in LACChain, so the reported performance and feasibility results are specific to that network and may not directly generalize to non-EVM blockchains.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
17 Valid · 9 Not valid · 21 Not checked · 63 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Similarly, Grover’s algorithm concedes a quadratic advantage for mining blocks in certain consensus protocols such as proof of work.”
§ Quantum-resistance in blockchain networks > Abstract The advent of quantum computing threatens blockchain protocols and networks because they utilize non-quantum resistant cryptographic algorithms. When quantum computers become robust enough to run Shor’s algorithm on a large scale, the most used asymmetric algorithms, utilized for digital signatures and message encryption, such as RSA, (EC)DSA, and (EC)DH, will be no longer secure. Quantum computers will be able to break them within a short period of time. Similarly, Grover’s algorithm concedes a quadratic advantage for mining blocks in certain consensus protocols such as proof of work. Today, there are hundreds of billions of dollars denominated in cryptocurrencies and other digital assets that rely on blockchain ledgers as well as thousands of blockchain-based applications storing value in blockchain networks. Cryptocurrencies and blockchain-based applications require solutions that guarantee quantum resistance in order to preserve the integrity of data and assets in these public and immutable ledgers. The quantum threat and some potential solutions are well understood and presented in the literature. However, most proposals are theoretical, require large QKD networks, or propose new quantum-resistant blockchain networks to be built from scratch. Our work, which is presented in this paper, is pioneer in proposing an end-to-end framework for post-quantum blockchain networks that can be applied to existing blockchain to achieve quantum-resistance. We have developed an open-source implementation in an Ethereum-based (i.e., EVM compatible) network that can be extended to other existing blockchains. For the implementation we have (i) used quantum entropy to generate post-quantum key pairs, (ii) established post-quantum TLS connections and X.509 certificates to secure the exchange of information between blockchain nodes over the internet without needing a large QKD network, (iii) introduced a post-quantum second signature in transactions using Falcon-512 post-quantum keys, and (iv) developed the first on-chain verification of post-quantum signatures using three different mechanisms that are compared and analyzed: Solidity smart-contracts run by the validators for each transaction, modified EVM Opcode, and precompiled smart contracts.
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [71] Grover, L. K. A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search. in Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing. 212–219 (1996). sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Abstract (page not listed) reports an O(√N) quantum search algorithm versus O(N) classical search, supporting the quadratic advantage. It does not address block mining or proof-of-work consensus, so the application to those protocols is not established by this paper. (LLM, conf=0.88)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The advent of quantum computing threatens blockchain protocols and networks because they utilize non-quantum resistant cryptographic algorithms.”
§ Quantum-resistance in blockchain networks > Abstract The advent of quantum computing threatens blockchain protocols and networks because they utilize non-quantum resistant cryptographic algorithms. When quantum computers become robust enough to run Shor’s algorithm on a large scale, the most used asymmetric algorithms, utilized for digital signatures and message encryption, such as RSA, (EC)DSA, and (EC)DH, will be no longer secure. Quantum computers will be able to break them within a short period of time. Similarly, Grover’s algorithm concedes a quadratic advantage for mining blocks in certain consensus protocols such as proof of work. Today, there are hundreds of billions of dollars denominated in cryptocurrencies and other digital assets that rely on blockchain ledgers as well as thousands of blockchain-based applications storing value in blockchain networks. Cryptocurrencies and blockchain-based applications require solutions that guarantee quantum resistance in order to preserve the integrity of data and assets in these public and immutable ledgers. The quantum threat and some potential solutions are well understood and presented in the literature. However, most proposals are theoretical, require large QKD networks, or propose new quantum-resistant blockchain networks to be built from scratch. Our work, which is presented in this paper, is pioneer in proposing an end-to-end framework for post-quantum blockchain networks that can be applied to existing blockchain to achieve quantum-resistance. We have developed an open-source implementation in an Ethereum-based (i.e., EVM compatible) network that can be extended to other existing blockchains. For the implementation we have (i) used quantum entropy to generate post-quantum key pairs, (ii) established post-quantum TLS connections and X.509 certificates to secure the exchange of information between blockchain nodes over the internet without needing a large QKD network, (iii) introduced a post-quantum second signature in transactions using Falcon-512 post-quantum keys, and (iv) developed the first on-chain verification of post-quantum signatures using three different mechanisms that are compared and analyzed: Solidity smart-contracts run by the validators for each transaction, modified EVM Opcode, and precompiled smart contracts.
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [19] Shor, P. W. Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete algorithms on a quantum computer. SIAM J. Comput. 26(5), 1484–1509 (1997). source
- Partly supportedcites [25] Chen, L., Jordan, S., Liu, Y.-K., Moody, D., Peralta, R., Perlner, R. & Smith-Tone, D. NIST Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography (2026). https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2016/nist.ir.8105.pdf. Accessed 07 Mar 2023 (2023). sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction (Table 1) says a large-scale quantum computer would make RSA and ECDSA insecure, supporting the general threat to existing cryptography. The paper does not identify blockchain protocols or networks or establish which algorithms they use, so the blockchain-specific claim goes beyond this source. (LLM, conf=0.86)
- Not matchedcites [26] National Security Agency/Central Security Service. The Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 and Quantum Computing FAQ, NSA (2016). https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071836/-1/-1/0/CSI_CNSA_2.0_FAQ_.PDF. Accessed 07 Mar 2023 (2023).
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites [27] Campagna, M., et al. (ETSI) Quantum safe cryptography and security. An introduction, benefits, enablers and challenges. in Technical Report of the European Telecommunications Standard Institute (2015).
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“QKD is not fully scalable today because ground-based key exchanges using optical fibers are limited to a few hundreds kilometers due to the degradation of the quantum states containing the keys35.”
§ Quantum-resistance in blockchain networks > Context > Current approaches for quantum-safe cryptography
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [35] Lucamarini, M., Yuan, Z. L., Dynes, J. F. & Shields, A. J. Overcoming the rate-distance limit of quantum key distribution without quantum repeaters. Nature 557, 400–403 (2018). sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Abstract reports a severe rate–distance limit for conventional fibre QKD, with an experimental example reaching 404 km only at 1.16 bits per hour. But it describes the limiting mechanism as optical-channel loss and falling key rates, not specifically degradation of quantum states, and proposes a scheme feasible over 550 km of standard fibre; it therefore does not establish a hard limit of a few hundred kilometres for fibre QKD generally. (LLM, conf=0.84)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“The most popular asymmetric cryptography schemes used today are believed to be vulnerable against quantum adversaries. These include RSA40,41, (Elliptic Curve) Digital Signature Algorithm42, and (Elliptic Curve) Diffie-Hellman43,44.”
§ Quantum-resistance in blockchain networks > Context > Current approaches for quantum-safe cryptography
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [40] Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A. & Adleman, L. A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Commun. ACM 21, 120–126 (1978). source
The citation is attached to “RSA” in the list of schemes, identifying the scheme rather than supporting the sentence’s quantum-vulnerability claim. The Abstract and Section XI describe the public-key cryptosystem introduced by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, so the identification is supported. (LLM, conf=0.90)
- Not matchedcites [42] Nigel, P. Smart, Cryptography Made Simple (Springer, 2016).
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [43] Diffie, W. & Hellman, M. R. New directions in cryptography. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 22, 644–654 (1976). source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“ground-to-satellite key exchanges require sophisticated infrastructure for generation, transmission, and reception of quantum keys36,37.”
§ Quantum-resistance in blockchain networks > Context > Current approaches for quantum-safe cryptography
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [36] Liao, S.-K. et al. Satellite-to-ground quantum key distribution. Nature 549, 43–47 (2017). sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The figure caption (p. 13) and Experimental challenges and solutions (p. 5) describe sophisticated equipment for generating, transmitting, and receiving quantum signals, including lasers, telescopes, detectors, and tracking systems. But the experiment sends those signals from satellite to ground; the paper does not establish the same infrastructure requirements for the claimed ground-to-satellite direction. (LLM, conf=0.86)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [37] Li, Y.-P. et al. Experimental realization of a reference-frame-independent decoy BB84 quantum key distribution based on Sagnac interferometer. Opt. Lett. 18(44), 4523–4526 (2019). source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
38 more claims · 2 with their cited sources checked
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- Probably not a substantial claim. 46
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- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Quantum-resistance in blockchain networks > Results II—our implementation in the EVM-compatible LACChain blockchain > Performance results
“In the classical scenario, the memory reaches maximum CPU consumption peaks between 30% and 35% and averages 21%, while the classical scenario reaches maximum CPU consumption peaks between 40% and 60% and averages 30%.”
§ Quantum-resistance in blockchain networks > Results II—our implementation in the EVM-compatible LACChain blockchain > Performance results
“Figure 15 depicts the behavior of the CPU consumption when sending 5 tx/s in both the classical and post-quantum scenarios.”
Citations
Cites
Quantum computation and quantum information
Law, J. (2001) · ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes · doi:10.1145/505482.505499 · Cited by 18,842
New directions in cryptography
Diffie, W., & Hellman, M. (1976) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.1976.1055638 · Cited by 14,713
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., & Adleman, L. (1978) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/359340.359342 · Cited by 13,462 · cited 1×
“In contrast, it is well known that public (asymmetric) key cryptographic protocols such as RSA [36, 37], (Elliptic Curve) Digital Signature Algorithm [38], and (Elliptic Curve) Diffie-Hellman [39, 40] are considered vulnerable to quantum attacks.”
BackgroundQuantum cryptography based on Bell’s theorem
Ekert, A. K. (1991) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.67.661 · Cited by 10,777 · cited 1×
“vesdropper, the information they contain (i.e., the bits of the key) is modied, and therefore the key is corrupted and the eavesdropper is detected. Best known QKD protocols are BB84 [26,27] and E91 [28]. An illustrative example of a QKD implementation is the BB84 protocol using polarized photons. In this protocol, we…”
BackgroundA fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search
Grover, L. K. (1996) · Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '96 · doi:10.1145/237814.237866 · Cited by 8,830 · cited 1×
“Quantum computers will be able to find these nonces quadratically faster using Grover’s algorithm [69].”
MethodPolynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete logarithms on a quantum computer
Shor, P. W. (1997) · SIAM Journal on Computing · doi:10.1137/s0097539795293172 · Cited by 8,472
Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing
Bennett, C. H., & Brassard, G. (2014) · Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2014.05.025 · Cited by 8,299 · cited 3×
“Best known QKD protocols are BB84 [26,27] and E91 [28].”
InfluentialQuantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing
Bennett, C. H., & Brassard, G. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2003.06557 · Cited by 8,299
Simulating physics with computers
Feynman, R. P. (1982) · International Journal of Theoretical Physics · doi:10.1007/bf02650179 · Cited by 7,691
Quantum theory, the Church–Turing principle and the universal quantum computer
Deutsch, D. (1985) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. A. Mathematical and Physical Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspa.1985.0070 · Cited by 4,597
Research works printed but not linked: 7
- Feynman, R. P. Feynman Lectures on Computation (Penguin Books, 2009).
- Kitaev, A.Y., Shen, A.H. & Vyhalyi, M.N. Classical and quantum computation. in Graduate Studies in Mathematics. Vol. 47. (American Mathematical Society, 1999).
- Nigel, P. Smart, Cryptography Made Simple (Springer, 2016).
- Punathumkandi, S. & Boscovic, D. A survey on quantum-safe blockchain system. in Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, Austin TX USA (2022).
- Chen, L., Jordan, S., Liu, Y.-K., Moody, D., Peralta, R., Perlner, R. & Smith-Tone, D. Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography-NISTIR 8105. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2016/NIST.IR.8105.pdf. Accessed 15 Mar 2021 (NIST, 2016). · DOI · Paper page
- Khalid, Z. M. & Askar, S. Resistant blockchain cryptography to quantum computing attacks. Int. J. Sci. Bus. 5(3), 116–125 (2021).
- Kwiatkowski, K., Sullivan, N., Langley, A., Levin, D. & Mislove, A. Measuring TLS key exchange with post-quantum KEM in Workshop Record of the Second PQC Standardization Conference. https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Events/Second-PQC-Standardization-Conference/documents/accepted-papers/kwiatkowski-measuring-tls.pdf. Accessed 07 Mar 2023 (2023).
Cited by
Post-Quantum Blockchain Security for the Internet of Things: Survey and Research Directions
Gharavi, H., Granjal, J., & Monteiro, E. (2024) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2024.3355222 · Cited by 201
“Furthermore, to protect the transmission of data between nodes in the LACChain blockchain, it can generate post-quantum X.509 certificates by modifying a version of libSSL, making post-quantum TLS connections between nodes using these certificates [161].”
MethodKuznetsov, A. A., Sernani, P., Romeo, L., Frontoni, E., & Mancini, A. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2023.3349019 · Cited by 216
“…the strategies mentioned involve a combination of technical solutions, such as the design of robust models or the adoption of quantum-resistant cryptography [71], and structural solutions [69], [70], such as the creation of interoperability standards or the implementation of regulations.”
Far, S. B., Rad, A. I., Bamakan, S. M. H., & Asaar, M. R. (2023) · Journal of Network and Computer Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2023.103675 · Cited by 88
Integrating Post-Quantum Cryptography and Blockchain to Secure Low-Cost IoT Devices
Castiglione, A., Esposito, J. G., Loia, V., Nappi, M., Pero, C., & Polsinelli, M. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2024.3485796 · Cited by 97
Archives of Quantum Computing: Research Progress and Challenges
Sood, V., & Chauhan, R. (2023) · Archives of Computational Methods in Engineering · doi:10.1007/s11831-023-09973-2 · Cited by 45
Metadata
- Authors
- Allende, M., León, D. L., Cerón, S., Pareja, A., Pacheco, E., Leal, A., Da Silva, M., Pardo, A., Jones, D., Worrall, D. J., Merriman, B., Gilmore, J., Kitchener, N., & Venegas-Andraca, S. E.
- Affiliations
- Inter-American Development Bank (US)
- Quantinuum (United Kingdom)
- Tecnológico de Monterrey (MX)
- Corresponding author
- Venegas-Andraca, Salvador E.
- Venue
- Scientific Reports
- Published
- 2023-04-06
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 5664-5664
- ISSN
- 2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC10079930
- OpenAlex
- W4362661849
- Cited by
- 109
- References
- 71
- Citations by year
- 2026: 21 · 2025: 44 · 2024: 33 · 2023: 8
- FWCI
- 13.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Scientific Reports (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- Inter-American Development Bank
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics › Quantum Information and Cryptography
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics › Quantum Mechanics and Applications
- Keywords
- quantum resistance, post-quantum cryptography, X.509 certificates, Solidity smart contracts, Ethereum, Shor's algorithm, Grover's algorithm, proof-of-work
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- Allende, M., León, D. L., Cerón, S., Pareja, A., Pacheco, E., Leal, A., Da Silva, M., Pardo, A., Jones, D., Worrall, D. J., Merriman, B., Gilmore, J., Kitchener, N., & Venegas-Andraca, S. E. (2023). Quantum-resistance in blockchain networks. Scientific Reports. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-32701-6
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