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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 4 of the 10 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Raw QPP-RNG randomness via system jitter across platforms: a NIST SP 800-90B evaluation

Open access
Vrana, Georgia, Lou, Dafu, Kuang, Randy · 2025 · Scientific Reports

Abstract

High-quality randomness is fundamental to the security of modern cryptographic systems. We present QPP-RNG , a true random number generator (TRNG) that harvests entropy from diverse system-level jitters–including CPU pipeline timing divergences, DRAM refresh cycle perturbations, cache miss-driven memory access latencies, and other subtle hardware and operating system-induced fluctuations. QPP-RNG’s core mechanism measures the elapsed time of randomized array sorting operations–where each Fisher-Yates shuffle is infinitesimally perturbed by these microscopic jitters–and amplifies these timing variations into cryptographically strong randomness through a quantum permutation pad (QPP) architecture, all achievable on commodity hardware. The raw output of QPP-RNG underwent rigorous evaluation for independent and identically distributed (IID) behavior using the NIST SP 800-90B IID test suite, alongside the comprehensive NIST SP 800-22 and ENT statistical test batteries. Across a range of platforms, including Windows, macOS, and Raspberry Pi, QPP-RNG consistently achieved high IID min-entropy between $$7.85$$ and $$7.95$$ bits/byte. It passed all NIST SP 800-90B IID tests with $$p$$ -values significantly above the $$\alpha =0.01$$ threshold, confirming that its generated randomness is statistically indistinguishable from ideal IID sources derived directly from system jitter. Cross-platform analyses spanning x86_64 and ARM64 architectures further demonstrate that the extracted jitter fingerprint–and consequently the generated randomness–exhibits remarkable statistical consistency, irrespective of the underlying hardware or operating system. QPP-RNG’s entropy density compares favorably with leading commercial entropy sources. It matches or slightly exceeds the NIST IID-certified min-entropy of ID Quantique’s Quantis QRNG (7.8744 bits/byte), and significantly outperforms both Red Hat’s CPU Time Jitter RNG (7.4528 bits/byte) and Quside’s PCIe One quantum entropy source (6.5136 bits/byte). Even against specialized hardware RNGs like Microchip’s ECC608 (4.0568 bits/byte), QPP-RNG demonstrates superior performance using only general-purpose processors. By effectively transforming otherwise discarded system noise into a reliable and high-quality entropy stream, QPP-RNG establishes a novel paradigm for embedded security, providing a robust entropy source on general-purpose devices without specialized hardware. This makes it especially well-suited for resource-constrained Internet of Things (IoT) and edge computing applications where strong entropy sources are paramount.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

This paper evaluates QPP-RNG, a software-only true random number generator that harvests system-level jitter through permutation-based sorting, across Windows, macOS, and Raspberry Pi platforms. Using NIST SP 800-90B IID testing plus ENT and NIST SP 800-22, the authors report near-ideal entropy and consistent cross-platform randomness.

## Key findings

  • Across tested configurations, the worst-case NIST SP 800-90B IID min-entropy was 7.8555 bits/byte and the best-case was 7.8779 bits/byte, exceeding the IID requirement of 7.2 bits/byte.
  • The paper reports a min-entropy of 7.928 bits per byte in the discussion, compared with 7.4528 bits/byte for Red Hat’s CPU Time Jitter RNG, 7.8744 bits/byte for ID Quantique Quantis, 6.5136 bits/byte for Quside PCIe One, and 4.0568 bits/byte for Microchip ECC608.
  • Health checks passed across platforms: the maximum observed repetition count was 3, and adaptive proportion thresholds were 13 to 16, with observed maxima of 9 to 10.
  • Additional tests also looked strong: ENT entropy exceeded 7.9997 bits/byte (maximum 7.99983), byte-frequency means were 3906.25 for 1,000,000-byte samples, and NIST SP 800-22 showed 100% passing for several tests, with non-overlapping template passing rates of 93% to 98%.

## Methods

  • The study evaluated QPP-RNG, a C implementation that measures timing jitter during repeated Fisher–Yates permutation-sorting cycles and extracts raw 8-bit outputs from timing deltas.
  • Experiments were run on heterogeneous bare-metal platforms, including Windows 11, macOS (Intel and Apple Silicon/M1), and Raspberry Pi 5 (ARM), using two internal PRNGs: XORSHIFT128+ and NEXT_X48.
  • Each configuration generated 1,000,000 bytes; the authors applied NIST SP 800-90B IID tests, restart and adaptive tests, the ENT suite, and NIST SP 800-22 statistical validation.

## Limitations

  • The paper states that it did not quantitatively isolate individual jitter sources; instead, sorting time served as an aggregate measure of CPU, memory, I/O, OS scheduling, and environmental timing variation.
  • It notes that some timing sources are too coarse and that timer resolution varies across platforms, which it mitigates with platform-specific scaling; this is an evident limitation of the approach.
  • The work focused on raw output evaluation and explicitly says post-processing/conditioning is for future or optional use, so the reported results do not assess conditioned outputs.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1038/s41598-025-13135-8

Cites

41 of 41 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Fig. 1 Byte-level histogram of QPP-RNG output (1,000,000 bytes) on Windows 11 with Intel.
Fig. 1 Byte-level histogram of QPP-RNG output (1,000,000 bytes) on Windows 11 with Intel.CC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 2 Byte-level histogram of QPP-RNG output (1,000,000 bytes) on Raspberry Pi 5.
Fig. 2 Byte-level histogram of QPP-RNG output (1,000,000 bytes) on Raspberry Pi 5.CC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 3 Byte-level histogram of QPP-RNG output (1,000,000 bytes) on macOS with Intel.
Fig. 3 Byte-level histogram of QPP-RNG output (1,000,000 bytes) on macOS with Intel.CC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 4 Byte-level histogram of QPP-RNG output (1,000,000 bytes) on macOS with M1 chip.
Fig. 4 Byte-level histogram of QPP-RNG output (1,000,000 bytes) on macOS with M1 chip.CC BY · PubMed Central

Verification

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Citations

Cites

Show all 44 references

Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. Chen, Y. & Patel, S. Entropy source identification in modern computing systems. IEEE Trans. Depend. Secure Comput. 20, 3125–3138. https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2023.3266789 (2023). · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2023.3266789
  2. Huang, L. & Kolesnikov, V. Quantum side-channel attacks on entropy sources: Implications for post-quantum RNG. IEEE Trans. Quantum Eng. 5, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1109/TQE.2024.3365678 (2024). · doi:10.1109/tqe.2024.3365678
  3. Miller, M. S. & Wang, H. A comparative analysis of high-resolution timers across modern operating systems.. Softw. Pract. Exp. 53, 745–760 (2024).
  4. Lehmer, D. H. Mathematical methods in large-scale computing units. Ann. Comput. Lab. Harvard Univ. 26, 141–146 (1949).
  5. Blackman, D. & Vigna, S. Scrambled linear pseudorandom number generators. ACM Trans. Math. Softw. 47, 1–32. https://doi.org/10.1145/3460772 (2021). · DOI
  6. Keller, P. & Schmidt, R. Adaptive bias suppression for jitter-based entropy sources. In 2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). 145–162. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.00012 (2023). · doi:10.1109/sp46215.2023.00012

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Vrana, G., Lou, D., & Kuang, R.
Affiliations
Quantropi (Canada) (CA)
Corresponding author
Kuang, Randy
Venue
Scientific Reports
Published
2025-07-29
Volume
15
Issue
1
Pages
27718-27718
ISSN
2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4412785372
Cited by
8
References
44
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 4
FWCI
2.06
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Scientific Reports (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
Keywords
true random number generator, min-entropy, entropy density, memory latency, Fisher-Yates shuffle, Internet of Things security, embedded systems security, NIST SP 800-22 statistical tests

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Raw QPP-RNG randomness via system jitter across platforms: a NIST SP 800-90B evaluation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1038/s41598-025-13135-8
The paper
Vrana, G., Lou, D., & Kuang, R. (2025). Raw QPP-RNG randomness via system jitter across platforms: a NIST SP 800-90B evaluation. Scientific Reports. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-13135-8

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