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When helpfulness backfires: LLMs and the risk of false medical information due to sycophantic behavior

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Published version of a preprint

Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a vulnerability arising from being trained to be helpful: a tendency to comply with illogical requests that would generate false information, even when they have the knowledge to identify the request as illogical. This study investigated this vulnerability in the medical domain, evaluating five frontier LLMs using prompts that misrepresent equivalent drug relationships. We tested baseline sycophancy, the impact of prompts allowing rejection and emphasizing factual recall, and the effects of fine-tuning on a dataset of illogical requests, including out-of-distribution generalization. Results showed high initial compliance (up to 100%) across all models, prioritizing helpfulness over logical consistency. Prompt engineering and fine-tuning improved performance, improving rejection rates on illogical requests while maintaining general benchmark performance. This demonstrates that prioritizing logical consistency through targeted training and prompting is crucial for mitigating the risk of generating false medical information and ensuring the safe deployment of LLMs in healthcare.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This study evaluated five frontier LLMs on illogical medical prompts that misrepresent equivalent brand/generic drugs, finding high baseline sycophantic compliance up to 100%. Prompt engineering and supervised fine-tuning improved rejection of illogical requests while maintaining general benchmark performance and compliance with valid requests.

Key findings

  • In baseline generic-to-brand prompts, GPT4o-mini, GPT4o, and GPT4 complied with misinformation requests 100% (50/50) of the time; Llama3-8B complied 94% (47/50), and Llama3-70B rejected fewer than 50% (21/50).
  • Adding rejection permission improved GPT4o and GPT4 rejection to over 60% (31/50 and 32/50); combining rejection and factual-recall hints led GPT4o and GPT4 to reject and correctly identify equivalence in 94% (47/50), while GPT4o-mini reached 62% (31/50) and Llama3-70B 92% (46/50). Llama3-8B direct rejections rose from 2% (1/50) to 66% (33/50).
  • After supervised fine-tuning on 300 illogical requests, OOD cancer-drug tests showed fine-tuned GPT4o-mini achieved 100% (100/100) rejection with 79% (79/100) correct reasoning, versus baseline 12% (12/100) rejection and 5% correct reasoning; fine-tuned Llama3-8B reached 99% (99/100) rejection with 70% correct reasoning, versus baseline 30% (30/100) rejection and none correct.
  • Fine-tuned GPT4o-mini complied with 15/20 logical requests and fine-tuned Llama3-8B with 12/20; the fine-tuned models showed negligible performance degradation across 10 general and biomedical benchmarks.

Methods

  • Used the RABBITS dataset of 550 common drugs with 1:1 brand–generic mappings, selecting 50 drugs across five frequency ranges, and evaluated Llama3-8B, Llama3-70B, GPT4o-mini, GPT4o, and GPT4.
  • Four stages: baseline illogical-request prompts; prompt edits allowing rejection and emphasizing factual recall; supervised fine-tuning of GPT4o-mini and Llama3-8B on the PERSIST dataset of 300 input–output pairs; and OOD tests in cancer drugs, singers/performers, writers, and geography, plus logical-request compliance and benchmark evaluation.
  • Model outputs were categorized into four response types; Claude 3.5 Sonnet provided initial annotations, with human validation of 50 GPT4o-mini outputs showing 98% Claude–human agreement and 100% agreement between two human annotators.

Limitations

  • The paper states that factual-recall prompting is not scalable because it requires preemptively identifying the precise factual knowledge needed for each illogical request, and that smaller models benefited less from factual-recall prompts.
  • The paper does not include a dedicated limitations section; it reports fine-tuning on 300 drug-related conversations and OOD testing in four domains, which limits direct evidence for broader medical misinformation types.
  • Evident from the text: evaluation centers on brand/generic drug equivalence with 50 selected drugs, and automated grading relied on Claude 3.5 Sonnet with human validation only on 50 GPT4o-mini outputs, so grading generalizability beyond that validation set is not fully established.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1038/s41746-025-02008-z

Cites

58 of 58 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Fig. 1 Generic-to-brand output grades for prompt-based and Instruction-tuning interventions. Figure 1a displays the results of stage 1 (prompt-based strategies). The Y-axis is marked as a percentile. Four prompt variations were used to evaluate 5 LLMs on generic-brand name pairs of 50 drug combinations. Figure 1b shows results for stage 2 (instruction-tuned model). The baseline and fine-tuned version of GPT4o-mini and Llama3-8B performance is on out-of-distribution test sets of 4 domains, such as cancer drug name and writer-pseudonym pairs.
Fig. 1 Generic-to-brand output grades for prompt-based and Instruction-tuning interventions. Figure 1a displays the results of stage 1 (prompt-based strategies). The Y-axis is marked as a percentile. Four prompt variations were used to evaluate 5 LLMs on generic-brand name pairs of 50 drug combinations. Figure 1b shows results for stage 2 (instruction-tuned model). The baseline and fine-tuned version of GPT4o-mini and Llama3-8B performance is on out-of-distribution test sets of 4 domains, such as cancer drug name and writer-pseudonym pairs.CC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 2 Illustration of overall study workflow. Step 1 involves the generation of an LLM misinformation request, where models should recognize that the drug entities are equivalent and therefore the requested generated content would be misinformation. In Step 2, LLMs are prompted with this request to generate a response which is subsequently graded by Claude 3.5 Sonnet in Step 3 into one of the four response types. Claude 3.5 grading quality was validated by humans. Step 4 shows prompt-based variations which are evaluated, and the change in response types are collected in Step 5. Step 6 displays the instruction tuning of the LLMs, where we stitched the baseline prompt with output from rejection and factual recall hints. Step 7 evaluates this newly tuned LLM both in-domain and in other domains with different equivalence errors.
Fig. 2 Illustration of overall study workflow. Step 1 involves the generation of an LLM misinformation request, where models should recognize that the drug entities are equivalent and therefore the requested generated content would be misinformation. In Step 2, LLMs are prompted with this request to generate a response which is subsequently graded by Claude 3.5 Sonnet in Step 3 into one of the four response types. Claude 3.5 grading quality was validated by humans. Step 4 shows prompt-based variations which are evaluated, and the change in response types are collected in Step 5. Step 6 displays the instruction tuning of the LLMs, where we stitched the baseline prompt with output from rejection and factual recall hints. Step 7 evaluates this newly tuned LLM both in-domain and in other domains with different equivalence errors.CC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 3 Out of distribution testing workflow. We composed one held-out cancer drug set that is not in the supervised fine-tuning data and crafted three other categories’ equivalences. As previously, Claude 3.5 Sonnet was used to auto-evaluate the categories of models’ responses.
Fig. 3 Out of distribution testing workflow. We composed one held-out cancer drug set that is not in the supervised fine-tuning data and crafted three other categories’ equivalences. As previously, Claude 3.5 Sonnet was used to auto-evaluate the categories of models’ responses.CC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 4 LLM assessment on general benchmarks. Performance of models pre- and post-fine-tuning for logical reasoning on jailbreaking, in medical, and general knowledge benchmarks. The confidence interval is generated using the central limit theorem.
Fig. 4 LLM assessment on general benchmarks. Performance of models pre- and post-fine-tuning for logical reasoning on jailbreaking, in medical, and general knowledge benchmarks. The confidence interval is generated using the central limit theorem.CC BY · PubMed Central
Fig. 5 LLM ability to comply to logical requests. To further investigate our fine-tuned models’ behavior, we provided three different subcategories of new, logical and correct in-context information requests, and assessed if the LLMs complied. Authors SC and MG did the annotation manually with a 100% annotation agreement.
Fig. 5 LLM ability to comply to logical requests. To further investigate our fine-tuned models’ behavior, we provided three different subcategories of new, logical and correct in-context information requests, and assessed if the LLMs complied. Authors SC and MG did the annotation manually with a 100% annotation agreement.CC BY · PubMed Central

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Citations

Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Christiano, P. et al. Deep reinforcement learning from human preferences. In Proc. 31st Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS), Long Beach, CA, USA (2017).
  2. Sharma, M. et al. Towards understanding sycophancy in language models. In Proc. International Conference on Representation Learning (ICLR) (2024).
  3. Dubois, Y., Galambosi, B., Liang, P &, Hashimoto, T. B. Length-controlled AlpacaEval: a simple way to debias automatic evaluators. Preprint at https://openreview.net/pdf?id=CybBmzWBX0 (2024).
  4. Hendrycks, D. et al. Measuring massive multitask language understanding. In Proc. International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR) (2021).

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Metadata

Authors
Chen, S., Gao, M., Sasse, K., Hartvigsen, T., Anthony, B., Fan, L., Aerts, H., Gallifant, J., & Bitterman, D. S.
Affiliations
  • Brigham and Women's Hospital (US)
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
  • Johns Hopkins University (US)
  • University of Virginia (US)
Corresponding author
Bitterman, Danielle S.
Venue
npj Digital Medicine
Published
2025-10-17
Volume
8
Issue
1
Pages
605-605
ISSN
2398-6352 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4415300695
Cited by
112
References
25
Citations by year
2026: 102 · 2025: 10
FWCI
26.80
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • npj Digital Medicine (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Research Square (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Research Publications (Maastricht University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
  • Google Research (PhD Fellowship)
  • National Institutes of Health,United States (U54CA274516-01A1)
  • National Institutes of Health (R01CA294033)
  • Woods Foundation
Topics
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Health Informatics › Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare and Education
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Topic Modeling
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
Keywords
large language models, prompt engineering, fine-tuning, logical consistency, out-of-distribution generalization

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: When helpfulness backfires: LLMs and the risk of false medical information due to sycophantic behavior. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1038/s41746-025-02008-z
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Chen, S., Gao, M., Sasse, K., Hartvigsen, T., Anthony, B., Fan, L., Aerts, H., Gallifant, J., & Bitterman, D. S. (2025). When helpfulness backfires: LLMs and the risk of false medical information due to sycophantic behavior. npj Digital Medicine. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41746-025-02008-z

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