The DOI matches its Crossref record.
The Psychology of Preferences
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.5.4.323 · Cited by 7,678
Status quo bias in decision making
Samuelson, W., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00055564 · Cited by 5,897
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Self-citationThe Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence
SHEFRIN, H., & STATMAN, M. (1985) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05002.x · Cited by 3,553
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A.
- Venue
- Scientific American
- Published
- 1982-01
- Volume
- 246
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 160-173
- ISSN
- 0036-8733 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2047174296
- Cited by
- 1,669
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 7.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Psychology of Preferences. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1038/scientificamerican0182-160
- The paper
- Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). The Psychology of Preferences. Scientific American. https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0182-160
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
