Irrational choice and the value of information
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Irrational decision making in humans and other species challenges the use of optimality in behavioural biology. Here we show that such observations are in fact powerful tools to understand the adaptive significance of behavioural mechanisms. We presented starlings choices between probabilistic alternatives, receiving or not information about forthcoming, delayed outcomes after their choices. Subjects could not use this information to alter the outcomes. Paradoxically, outcome information induced loss-causing preference for the lower probability option. The effect depended on time under uncertainty: information given just after each choice caused strong preference for lower probability, but information just before the outcome did not. A foraging analysis shows that these preferences would maximize gains if post-choice information were usable, as when predators abandon a chase when sure of the prey escaping. Our study illustrates how experimentally induced irrational behaviour supports rather than weakens the evolutionary optimality approach to animal behaviour.
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Cites
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“1038/srep13874 According to equation (6), Pinfo, noninfo > 1, for all 0 < Pnoninfo < 1, namely Info is preferred against Noninfo regardless of reward probability in the informational option.”
BackgroundInfluentialMidbrain Dopamine Neurons Signal Preference for Advance Information about Upcoming Rewards
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Cited by
Towards a neuroscience of active sampling and curiosity
Gottlieb, J., & Oudeyer, P.-Y. (2018) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-018-0078-0 · Cited by 494
Computational mechanisms of curiosity and goal-directed exploration
Schwartenbeck, P., Passecker, J., Hauser, T. U., FitzGerald, T. H., Kronbichler, M., & Friston, K. J. (2019) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.41703 · Cited by 254
Play in predictive minds: A cognitive theory of play.
Andersen, M. M., Kiverstein, J., Miller, M., & Roepstorff, A. (2023) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000369 · Cited by 122
Play, Curiosity, and Cognition
Chu, J., & Schulz, L. E. (2020) · Annual Review of Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-devpsych-070120-014806 · Cited by 93
Metadata
- Authors
- Vasconcelos, M., Monteiro, T., & Kacelnik, A.
- Venue
- Scientific Reports
- Published
- 2015-09-09
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 13874-13874
- ISSN
- 2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2416513663
- Cited by
- 139
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 7.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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