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Cited by 2,005

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation

Hartzell, Jay C., Starks, Laura T.·2003·The Journal of Finance
DOI 10.1046/j.1540-6261.2003.00608.x
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Abstract

We find that institutional ownership concentration is positively related to the pay‐for‐performance sensitivity of executive compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation, even after controlling for firm size, industry, investment opportunities, and performance. These results suggest that the institutions serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency problem between shareholders and managers. Additionally, we find that clientele effects exist among institutions for firms with certain compensation structures, suggesting that institutions also influence compensation structures through their preferences.

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Metadata

Authors
Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2003-11-07
Volume
58
Issue
6
Pages
2351-2374
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
DOI
10.1046/j.1540-6261.2003.00608.x
OpenAlex
W3124477224
Cited by
2,005
References
2
FWCI
114.39
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1046/j.1540-6261.2003.00608.x
The paper
Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. (2003). Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1540-6261.2003.00608.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.