The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation
Abstract
We find that institutional ownership concentration is positively related to the pay‐for‐performance sensitivity of executive compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation, even after controlling for firm size, industry, investment opportunities, and performance. These results suggest that the institutions serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency problem between shareholders and managers. Additionally, we find that clientele effects exist among institutions for firms with certain compensation structures, suggesting that institutions also influence compensation structures through their preferences.
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Cites
Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring
Holmström, B., & Tirole, J. (1993) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261893 · Cited by 1,719
Preferences for Stock Characteristics As Revealed by Mutual Fund Portfolio Holdings
FALKENSTEIN, E. G. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05204.x · Cited by 1,058
Cited by
Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors
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Self-citationAnticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership
AZAR, J., SCHMALZ, M. C., & TECU, I. (2018) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12698 · Cited by 980
“Following Hartzell and Starks (2003), we include the share of institutional ownership, institutional ownership concentration (measured as the HHI of the institutional ownership shares), and the fraction of total institutional ownership that is owned by the top five institutional owners in the firm.”
BackgroundInstitutional shareholders and corporate social responsibility
Chen, T., Dong, H., & Lin, C. (2020) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.06.007 · Cited by 975
CEO Compensation and Board Structure
CHHAOCHHARIA, V., & GRINSTEIN, Y. (2009) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01433.x · Cited by 611
Presidential Address: Sustainable Finance and ESG Issues— Value versus Values
STARKS, L. T. (2023) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.13255 · Cited by 474
Self-citationOwnership as a form of corporate governance
Connelly, B. L., Hoskisson, R. E., Tihanyi, L., & Certo, S. T. (2010) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00929.x · Cited by 389
Are U.S. CEOs Paid More? New International Evidence
Fernandes, N., Ferreira, M. A., Matos, P., & Murphy, K. J. (2013) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhs122 · Cited by 302
Corporate Environmental Policy and Shareholder Value: Following the Smart Money
Fernando, C. S., Sharfman, M. P., & Uysal, V. B. (2017) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109017000680 · Cited by 241
Starks, L. T. (2009) · Financial Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6288.2009.00225.x · Cited by 233
Self-citationInstitutional investor cliques and governance
Crane, A. D., Koch, A., & Michenaud, S. (2019) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.11.012 · Cited by 214
Institutional Investors and Mutual Fund Governance: Evidence from Retail–Institutional Fund Twins
Evans, R. B., & Fahlenbrach, R. (2012) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhs105 · Cited by 189
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
Anton, M., Ederer, F., Gine, M., & Schmalz, M. C. (2016) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2802332 · Cited by 150
A New Look at Oligopoly: Implicit Collusion Through Portfolio Diversification
Azar, J. (2012) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1993364 · Cited by 87
The cost of financial flexibility: Evidence from share repurchases
Bonaimé, A. A., Hankins, K. W., & Jordan, B. D. (2016) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.02.002 · Cited by 68
Reduction in Corporate Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under Prescriptive Disclosure Requirements
Jouvenot, V., & Krueger, P. (2019) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3434490 · Cited by 26
An Investor Perspective on the Black Box of Corporate Social Responsibility
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2003-11-07
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2351-2374
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3124477224
- Cited by
- 2,005
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 114.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
