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Rational autocrats? Drivers of corruption patterns in competitive authoritarian regimes: towards an explanatory framework with empirical applications from Hungary

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Hajnal, Áron·2025·European Political Science
DOI 10.1057/s41304-025-00514-y
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Abstract

Competitive authoritarianism, a specific type of hybrid regime, is gaining ground globally. Corruption is particularly prevalent in these contexts as regimes utilise it to consolidate their power. However, some competitive authoritarian regimes also take significant measures to curb certain types of corruption. The present article posits that competitive authoritarian regimes, acting as rational utility-maximising actors, curb or enhance corruption types based on the net costs and benefits—that is, net gains—they yield for the regime. To elucidate the factors influencing net gains, an explanatory framework is presented. Its three constituent elements are accountability costs, transaction costs, and political benefits. The applicability of the framework is demonstrated with case studies of two corruption types in Hungary, namely, informal payments in healthcare and clientelism in awarding tobacco retail concessions.

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Cited by

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Authors
Hajnal, Á.
Affiliations
Corvinus University of Budapest (HU)
Corresponding author
Hajnal, Áron
ORCID
Hajnal, Áron
Venue
European Political Science
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2025-06
Volume
24
Issue
2
Pages
178-197
ISSN
  • 1680-4333 (ISSN-L)
  • 1682-0983
DOI
10.1057/s41304-025-00514-y
OpenAlex
W4406761618
Cited by
6
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 3
FWCI
10.43
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • European Political Science (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Corvinus Research Archive (Corvinus University of Budapest) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
Corvinus University of Budapest
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
Keywords
competitive authoritarianism, corruption, hybrid regimes, corruption control, transaction costs, political benefits, clientelism, Hungary

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