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PreprintCited by 65Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior

Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game

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Engelmann, Dirk, Fischbacher, Urs·2003·SSRN Electronic Journal
DOI 10.2139/ssrn.352540
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Abstract

We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that while pure indirect reciprocity appears to be important, the helping choice seems to be influenced at least as much by strategic considerations. Strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.

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67 of 67 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Experiments investigating whether a player's justified defections lowers his or her chance to receive subsequent donations indicate that cognitive problems challenge the donor.

    “Experiments investigating whether a player's justified defections lowers his or her chance to receive subsequent donations indicate that cognitive problems challenge the donor 64 .”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [64]

  • Players faced with a full history of all previous rounds take in general a longer time to reach their decision, suggesting that they attempt to take into account, not only their recipient's last move, but also that of their recipient's recipient.

    “Players faced with a full history of all previous rounds take in general a longer time to reach their decision, suggesting that they attempt to take into account, not only their recipient's last move, but also that of their recipient's recipient.”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [64]

  • Players who justifiably refuse to donate to a defector display in the following round an increased tendency to provide donations, as if to make up for that refusal.

    “Moreover, players who justifiably refuse to donate to a defector display in the following round an increased tendency to provide donations, as if to make up for that refusal.”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [64]

  • The statistics of such games with full information look surprisingly similar to those obtained when players know only the score of the recipient.

    “Nonetheless, the statistics of such games with full information look surprisingly similar to those obtained when players know only the score of the recipient.”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [64]

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Authors
Engelmann, D., & Fischbacher, U.
Affiliations
  • University of London (GB)
  • University of Konstanz (DE)
Corresponding author
Engelmann, Dirk
ORCID
Fischbacher, Urs
Venue
SSRN Electronic Journal
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2003
ISSN
1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2139/ssrn.352540
OpenAlex
W3121776131
Cited by
64
References
68
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 2
Type
posted content
Language
en
Open access
Locations
SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
indirect reciprocity, helping behavior, cooperation, experimental economics

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