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Mental models and human reasoning

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Johnson-Laird, Philip N.·2010·Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
DOI 10.1073/pnas.1012933107
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Abstract

To be rational is to be able to reason. Thirty years ago psychologists believed that human reasoning depended on formal rules of inference akin to those of a logical calculus. This hypothesis ran into difficulties, which led to an alternative view: reasoning depends on envisaging the possibilities consistent with the starting point—a perception of the world, a set of assertions, a memory, or some mixture of them. We construct mental models of each distinct possibility and derive a conclusion from them. The theory predicts systematic errors in our reasoning, and the evidence corroborates this prediction. Yet, our ability to use counterexamples to refute invalid inferences provides a foundation for rationality. On this account, reasoning is a simulation of the world fleshed out with our knowledge, not a formal rearrangement of the logical skeletons of sentences.

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Metadata

Authors
Johnson-Laird, P. N.
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Publisher
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published
2010-10-18
Volume
107
Issue
43
Pages
18243-18250
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
DOI
10.1073/pnas.1012933107
OpenAlex
W2084092936
Cited by
575
References
6
FWCI
13.60
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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