Rational explanation of the selection task.

Abstract

M. Oaksford and N. Chater (O&C; 1994) presented the first quantitative model of P. C. Wason's ( 1966, 1968) selection task in.which performance is rational. J. St B T Evans and D. E. Over (1996) reply that O&C's account is normatively incorrect and cannot model K. N. Kirby's (1994b) or P. Pollard and J. St B T Evans's (1983) data. It is argued that an equivalent measure satisfies their normative concerns and that a modification of O&C's model accounts for their empirical concerns. D. Laming (1996) argues that O&C made unjustifiable psychological assumptions and that a "correct" Bayesian analysis agrees with logic. It is argued that O&C's model makes normative and psychological sense and that Laming's analysis is not Bayesian. A. Almor and S. A. Sloman (1996) argue that O&C cannot explain their data. It is argued that Almor and Sloman's data do not bear on O&C's model because they alter the nature of the task. It is concluded that O&C's model remains the most compelling and comprehensive account of the selection task. Research on Wason's (1966, 1968) selection task questions human rationality because performance is not "logically correct?' Recently, Oaksford and Chater (O&C; 1994) provided a rational analysis (Anderson, 1990, 1991) of the selection task that appeared to vindicate human rationality. O&C argued that the selection task is an inductive, rather than a deductive, reasoning task: Participants must assess the truth or falsity of a general rule from specific instances. In particular, participants face a problem of optimal data selection (Lindley, 1956): They must decide which of four cards (p, not-p, q, or not-q) is likely to provide the most useful data to test a conditional rule,/fp then q. The "logical " solution is to select the p and the not-q cards. O&C argued that this solution presupposes falsificationism (Popper, 1959), which argues that only data that can disconfirm, not confirm, hypotheses are of interest. In contrast, O&C's rational analysis uses a Bayesian approach to inductive

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