Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 169

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Collapse of cooperation in evolving games

Open access
Stewart, Alexander J., Plotkin, Joshua B. · 2014 · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Abstract

Significance: This study offers a new perspective on an age-old question: When does cooperation emerge in populations? Two-player games used to study this question produce an array of counterintuitive results. And yet a consensus has emerged that, in an evolving population, cooperation tends to triumph over cheating––through reciprocity and generosity. But, what happens when players can influence not only their tendencies to cooperate, but also the rewards they reap for cooperation? We analyze coevolution of strategies and payoffs and find that, as individuals maximize the benefits of cooperation, they often pave the way for its collapse. Our analysis provides a framework for studying the coevolution of games and strategies, and suggests that maintaining cooperation may be more difficult than previously thought.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1073/pnas.1408618111

Cites

6 of 6 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Cited by

See all 169

Metadata

Authors
Stewart, A. J., & Plotkin, J. B.
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published
2014-11-24
Volume
111
Issue
49
Pages
17558-17563
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
OpenAlex
W1995790672
Cited by
169
References
6
FWCI
39.99
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Collapse of cooperation in evolving games. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1073/pnas.1408618111
The paper
Stewart, A. J., & Plotkin, J. B. (2014). Collapse of cooperation in evolving games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1408618111

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.