Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
Abstract
Learning to Work Together: In group endeavors, there is often a tension between working for the greater good of the group as a whole versus working for one's own benefit. Sometimes these paths coincide and sometimes they do not; furthermore, the choices made by other group members can influence the calculation of which path to take. A pair of studies now approaches this challenge from experimental and theoretical points of view. In a forest or fishery, harvesting of wood or food needs to take into account the renewable character of the resource, as well as spatial heterogeneity. Janssen et al. (p. 613 ; see the Perspective by Putterman ) show that communication among the group members is key, both to establishing a maintainable rate of harvesting, as well as enforcement via punishment of noncompliers. Boyd et al. (p. 617 ; see the Perspective by Putterman ) develop a model showing that punishment, which is a costly activity, is most effectively levied when implemented with the approval of group members; that is, coordinated punishment works to the benefit of the whole, whereas individual actions do not.
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Individuals react in socially desirable ways to even the slightest cues indicating that someone may be watching.
“research findings generally agree that individuals react in socially desirable ways to even the slightest cues indicating that someone may be watching (Bateson et al. 2006; Boyd et al. 2010; Burnham and Johnson 2005; Haley and Fessler 2005; but cf. Northover et al. 2017).”
From Paradoxical effects of self-awareness of being observed: testing the effect of police body-worn cameras on assaults and aggression against officers (2018) · cites this paper as Boyd et al. 2010
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- Authors
- Boyd, R., Gintis, H., & Bowles, S.
- Affiliations
- Santa Fe Institute (US)
- University of Siena (IT)
- Corresponding author
- Boyd, Robert
- Gintis, Herbert
- Bowles, Samuel
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2010-04-30
- Volume
- 328
- Issue
- 5978
- Pages
- 617-620
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W1985340978
- Cited by
- 613
- References
- 7
- Citations by year
- 2026: 16 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 35 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 31 · 2021: 47 · 2020: 37 · 2019: 28 · 2018: 28 · 2017: 44 · 2016: 33 · 2015: 52 · 2014: 51 · 2013: 45 · 2012: 51
- FWCI
- 159.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, free-riding, cost of punishment
- MeSH terms
- Communication, Cooperative Behavior, Games, Experimental, Group Processes, Humans, Models, Psychological, Punishment, Social Behavior
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