Belief in free will affects causal attributions when judging others’ behavior
Open accessAbstract
Significance: The question whether free will exists or not has been a matter of debate in philosophy for centuries. Recently, researchers claimed that free will is nothing more than a myth. Although the validity of this claim is debatable, it attracted much attention in the general public. This raises the crucial question whether it matters if people believe in free will or not. In six studies, we tested whether believing in free will is related to the correspondence bias—that is, people’s automatic tendency to overestimate the influence of internal as compared to external factors when interpreting others’ behavior. Overall, we demonstrate that believing in free will increases the correspondence bias and predicts prescribed punishment and reward behavior.
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Free will beliefs were found to be associated with an overestimation of internal factors compared to external factors when evaluating others' behavior.
“Fourth, free will beliefs were found to be associated with an overestimation of the influence of internal (dispositional and fixed) factors as compared to external (varying and adaptable) factors when evaluating others' behavior (Genschow et al., 2017).”
From Agency and self-other asymmetries in perceived bias and shortcomings: Replications of the Bias Blind Spot and link to free will beliefs (2021) · cites this paper as Genschow et al., 2017
The Results report that stronger free-will belief correlated with attributing others’ behavior more to internal than external factors. The paper describes these as person and situation attributions, but the cited passages do not establish that internal factors are fixed or external factors are adaptable. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredFree will beliefs in reference to the self are related to the nature of introspection accessed.
“This indicates that free will beliefs in reference to the self are related to the nature of introspection accessed, complementing previous work that argued that free will beliefs impact fundamental socio-cognitive processes (Genschow et al., 2017).”
From Agency and self-other asymmetries in perceived bias and shortcomings: Replications of the Bias Blind Spot and link to free will beliefs (2021) · cites this paper as Genschow et al., 2017
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Cites
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Mini Meta‐Analysis of Your Own Studies: Some Arguments on Why and a Primer on How
Goh, J. X., Hall, J. A., & Rosenthal, R. (2016) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/spc3.12267 · Cited by 994 · see citing works
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Chandrashekar, S. P., Yeung, S. K., Yau, K. C., Cheung, C. Y., Agarwal, T. K., Wong, C. Y. J., Pillai, T., Thirlwell, T. N., Leung, W. N., Tse, C., et al. (2021) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500008470 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
“This indicates that free will beliefs in reference to the self are related to the nature of introspection accessed, complementing previous work that argued that free will beliefs impact fundamental socio-cognitive processes (Genschow et al., 2017).”
- Authors
- Genschow, O., Rigoni, D., & Brass, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Cologne (DE)
- Ghent University (BE)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Publisher
- National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2017-08-30
- Volume
- 114
- Issue
- 38
- Pages
- 10071-10076
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- PMC
- PMC5617252
- OpenAlex
- W2753625302
- Cited by
- 82
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 4
- FWCI
- 4.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Kölner Universitäts PublikationsServer (Universität zu Köln) (publishedVersion)
- Ghent University Academic Bibliography (Ghent University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- VUBIR (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation
- Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung (168007)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Keywords
- free will, belief in free will, correspondence bias, causal attribution, social cognition, moral judgment, reward and punishment, attribution bias
- MeSH terms
- Adolescent, Adult, Aged, Behavior, Culture, Female, Humans, Male, Middle Aged, Morals, Social Behavior, Social Perception, Bias, Personal Autonomy
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