The consequences of online partisan media
Open accessAbstract
Significance: Popular wisdom suggests that the internet plays a major role in influencing people’s attitudes and behaviors related to politics, such as by providing slanted sources of information. Yet evidence for this proposition is elusive due to methodological difficulties and the multifaceted nature of online media effects. This study breaks ground by demonstrating a nudge-like approach for exploring these effects through a combination of real-world experimentation and computational social science techniques. The results confirm that it is difficult for people to be persuaded by competing media accounts during a contentious election campaign. At the same time, data from a longer time span suggest that the real consequence of online partisan media may be an erosion of trust in mainstream news.
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Populist politics often coupled with right-wing nationalist ideologies artificially divide society into a corrupt elite opposed by the people, which runs counter to pluralistic democracy and undermines citizens' trust in politics and media.
“Likewise, populist politics that are often coupled with right-wing nationalist ideologies, artificially divide society into a corrupt ‘elite’ that is opposed by ‘the people’, which runs counter to the ideals of a pluralistic democracy and undermines citizens’ trust in politics and the media36,37.”
From A systematic review of worldwide causal and correlational evidence on digital media and democracy (2022) · cites this paper as [37]
The Discussion reports suggestive evidence that increased exposure to online partisan news may lower trust in mainstream media. It does not address populism’s division of society into ‘elite’ and ‘people,’ right-wing nationalism, pluralistic democracy, or diminished trust in politics; nor does it attribute the media-trust effect specifically to populist politics. The indexed passages provide section labels but no page numbers. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredPersuasion is difficult; the effects of information on beliefs and opinion are often small and temporary and may be especially difficult to change during a contentious presidential election.
“persuasion is simply difficult—the effects of information on beliefs and opinion are often small and temporary and may be especially difficult to change during a contentious presidential election33,40–43”
From Like-minded sources on Facebook are prevalent but not polarizing (2023) · cites this paper as [33]
The Abstract (page unavailable) says people were difficult to persuade with competing media accounts during a contentious election campaign, and the Results (page unavailable) report little measurable change in many attitudes. The paper does not establish that effects on beliefs and opinions are generally temporary; its Results instead describe a lasting decline in media trust, a distinct outcome. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe myth of fake news being common makes people more skeptical of news in general.
“Similar to the idea of perceived polarization increasing actual polarization, the myth of fake news being common makes people more skeptical of news in general (Altay, Berriche, & Acerbi, 2022; Fletcher & Nielsen, 2019; Guess et al., 2021).”
From Social Drivers and Algorithmic Mechanisms on Digital Media. (2024) · cites this paper as Guess et al., 2021
The Results and Discussion report that increased exposure to online partisan news was associated with reduced trust in mainstream media. They do not examine whether believing fake news is common causes that skepticism; the mechanism attributed to this paper is unsupported. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredPartisans consume media from across the partisan divide but do not trust what opposing media channels tell them.
“In other words, partisans consume media from across the partisan divide but do not trust in what opposing media channels tell them.”
From How digital media drive affective polarization through partisan sorting (2022) · cites this paper as [96]
The Discussion (page not available) says exposure to cross-cutting information is relatively common. It also reports reduced overall trust in mainstream media and suggests people may discount challenging content. It does not establish that partisans specifically distrust what opposing media channels tell them; that conclusion is more definite and more source-specific than the paper's finding. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredA field experiment in the United States that set browser defaults to partisan media outlets found a long-term loss of trust in mainstream media.
“A field experiment in the United States that set browser defaults to partisan media outlets37 found a long-term loss of trust in mainstream media.”
From A systematic review of worldwide causal and correlational evidence on digital media and democracy (2022) · cites this paper as [37]
One field experiment did not find evidence that exposure to partisan online news substantively shifted political opinions but found a long-term loss of trust in mainstream media.
“Furthermore, one other field experiment did not find evidence that exposure to partisan online news substantively shifted political opinions but found a long-term loss of trust in mainstream media37.”
From A systematic review of worldwide causal and correlational evidence on digital media and democracy (2022) · cites this paper as [37]
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References 68 · Cited by 189
Research works printed but not linked: 24
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- Authors
- Guess, A. M., Barberá, P., Munzert, S., & Yang, J.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- University of Southern California (US)
- Hertie School (DE)
- University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (US)
- Corresponding author
- Guess, Andrew M.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Publisher
- National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2021-03-29
- Volume
- 118
- Issue
- 14
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- PMC
- PMC8040813
- OpenAlex
- W3149746057
- Cited by
- 189
- References
- 68
- Citations by year
- 2026: 20 · 2025: 43 · 2024: 39 · 2023: 48 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 2
- FWCI
- 42.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- OPUS 4 (Zuse Institute Berlin) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Volkswagen Foundation (92 143)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
- Keywords
- news consumption, media polarization, social media followers, 2018 midterm elections, computational social science
- MeSH terms
- Humans, Mass Media, Surveys and Questionnaires, Dissent and Disputes, Social Media
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