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Game theory and reciprocity in some extensive form experimental games

Open access
McCabe, Kevin A., Rassenti, Stephen J., Smith, Vernon L. · 1996 · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Cited by 157

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We examine decision making in two-person extensive form game trees using nine treatments that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information. Our objective is to establish replicable principles of cooperative versus noncooperative behavior that involve the use of signaling, reciprocity, and backward induction strategies, depending on the availability of dominated direct punishing strategies and the probability of repeated interaction with the same partner. Contrary to the predictions of game theory, we find substantial support for cooperation under complete information even in various single-play treatments.

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Crossref · 10.1073/pnas.93.23.13421

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Metadata

Authors
McCabe, K. A., Rassenti, S. J., & Smith, V. L.
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published
1996-11-12
Volume
93
Issue
23
Pages
13421-13428
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
OpenAlex
W2155281098
Cited by
157
References
3
FWCI
5.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Game theory and reciprocity in some extensive form experimental games. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1073/pnas.93.23.13421
The paper
McCabe, K. A., Rassenti, S. J., & Smith, V. L. (1996). Game theory and reciprocity in some extensive form experimental games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.93.23.13421

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.