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Cited by 75Embodied and Extended CognitionAction Observation and SynchronizationPhenomenology and Existential Philosophy

Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context

Rietveld, Erik·2012·Advances in Consciousness Research
DOI 10.1075/aicr.86.11rie
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Abstract

There are important structural similarities in the way that animals and humans engage in unreflective activities, including unreflective social interactions in the case of higher animals. Firstly, it is a form of unreflective embodied intelligence that is ‘motivated’ by the situation. Secondly, both humans and non-human animals are responsive to ‘affordances’ (Gibson 1979); to possibilities for action offered by an environment. Thirdly, both humans and animals are selectively responsive to one affordance rather than another. Social affordances are a subcategory of affordances, namely possibilities for social interaction offered by an environment: a friend’s sad face invites comforting behavior, a person waiting for a coffee machine can afford a conversation, and an extended hand affords a handshake. I will review recent insights in the nature of the bodily intentionality characteristic of unreflective action. Such ‘motor intentionality’ can be characterized as “our direct bodily inclination to act in a situated, environmental context” (Kelly 2005, p. 106). Standard interpretations of bodily intentionality see grasping an object as the paradigmatic example of motor intentionality. I will discuss the implications of another, novel perspective that emphasizes the importance of unreflective switches from one activity to another (Rietveld 2004) and understands bodily intentionality in terms of adequate responsiveness to a field of relevant affordances. In the final section I will discuss some implications for cognitive neuroscientists who use empirical findings related to the ‘mirror neuron system’ as a starting point for a theory of motor intentionality and social cognition. Keywords: embodied cognition; enaction; motor intentionality; affective cognition; field of affordances

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  • When affordances are relevant to the moment's action orientation and concern engagement, they do influence the course of further processing.

    “In contrast, when affordances are relevant to the moment’s action orientation and concern engagement, they do influence the course of further processing (Rietveld, 2008, 2012).”

    From Impulsive action: emotional impulses and their control (2014) · cites this paper as Rietveld, 2012

  • Every adult has a huge repertoire of relational action skills, both pragmatic and social.

    “Every adult has a huge repertoire of relational action skills, both pragmatic and social one’s (Rietveld, 2012).”

    From Impulsive action: emotional impulses and their control (2014) · cites this paper as Rietveld, 2012

  • Many relational action skills have innate bases in body structure that develop into true skills by pragmatic activities and play, form sources for perceiving affordances, and can be adapted to other contexts than those in which they developed.

    “Many of those skills have innate bases in body structure – clawing, biting, crawling, and grasping are prime examples in humans and other animals – that develop into true skills by pragmatic activities and play (e.g., Campos et al., 1996), that in turn form sources for perceiving affordances (Rietveld, 2012), and that can be adapted to other contexts than those in which they developed.”

    From Impulsive action: emotional impulses and their control (2014) · cites this paper as Rietveld, 2012

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Authors
Rietveld, E.
Affiliations
University of Amsterdam (NL)
Corresponding author
Rietveld, Erik
ORCID
Rietveld, Erik
Venue
Advances in Consciousness Research
Publisher
John Benjamins Publishing Company
Published
2012-07-23
Pages
207-226
ISSN
1381-589X (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1075/aicr.86.11rie
OpenAlex
W132424788
Cited by
75
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 4
FWCI
7.42
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Advances in consciousness research (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • European Science Foundation
  • Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
  • European Social Fund
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
Keywords
motor intentionality, social affordances, affordances, embodied cognition, enaction, affective cognition, mirror neuron system, social cognition, animal cognition, non-human animals

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