Cited by 77Embodied and Extended CognitionPhenomenology and Existential PhilosophyArchitecture, Modernity, and Design

Optimal Grip on Affordances in Architectural Design Practices: An Ethnography

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Rietveld, Erik, Brouwers, Anne Ardina·2017·Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Abstract

In this article we move beyond the problematic distinction between ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ cognition by accounting for so-called ‘higher’ cognitive capacities in terms of skillful activities in practices, and in terms of the affordances exploited in those practices. Through ethnographic research we aim to further develop the new notion of skilled intentionality by turning to the phenomenon of the tendency towards an optimal grip on a situation in real-life situations in the field of architecture. Tending towards an optimal grip is an inherently affective and dynamic phenomenon. It has been under explored in philosophy, despite its central place in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. When the architects experience discontent, attention is typically solicited by the affordances through which possible ways of continuing the improvement of the design can be explored. In various ways this tension or disequilibrium - fueling a tendency towards an optimal grip - is encountered in the complex architectural design practices that we observed. Based on our field material we distinguish between: a) grip in visual perception, b) grip on the design, and c) grip on ‘how to design’. The move towards an optimal grip takes shape by joining forces with a landscape of affordances. This landscape includes, for instance, affordances for grasping a cup of coffee, affordances provided by a cardboard model to improve it, as well as for engaging with a person who is not physically present. Because they are skilled, the architects can be responsive to these different affordances in similar ways. Furthermore, in practice the architects are responsive to multiple affordances simultaneously. Through our analysis of the tendency towards an optimal grip we show that our surroundings contribute to skillful action and cognition in a far more complex way than is currently acknowledged in philosophy and cognitive science.

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  • Geometrical features of the environment have been shown to shape dwellers' behavior at multiple spatial and temporal scales.

    “In philosophy (Rietveld & Brouwers 2017), psychology (Gibson 1979), ecology (Dale & Fortin 2014), and urban planning (Batty 2008), geometrical features of the environment have been shown to shape dwellers' behavior at multiple spatial and temporal scales”

    From Paths to Diversity: A Simulation of Conformity in Environments with Different Geometries (2025) · cites this paper as Rietveld & Brouwers 2017

    The Conclusion (page unavailable) describes architects responding to affordances in their studio and analyzes their actions over a longer timescale. This supports the general idea that surroundings shape activity, but the paper does not establish that geometrical features shape dwellers’ behavior across multiple spatial and temporal scales. (LLM, conf=0.84)

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Research works printed but not linked: 37

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Authors
Rietveld, E., & Brouwers, A. A.
Affiliations
  • University of Amsterdam (NL)
  • Amsterdam UMC Location University of Amsterdam (NL)
Corresponding author
Rietveld, Erik
Venue
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Published
2016-07-05
Volume
16
Issue
3
Pages
545-564
ISSN
  • 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-8676
OpenAlex
W2469614650
Cited by
77
References
7
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 1
FWCI
3.82
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Pure Amsterdam UMC (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NL) (VIDI-276-20-019)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Architecture › Architecture, Modernity, and Design
Keywords
affordances, architectural practice, Merleau-Ponty, higher cognition, visual perception, affect, design process, embodied cognition

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