Anti-luck epistemology
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A belief is safe just in case it could not easily have been false.
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From The Epistemic Cost of Opacity: How the Use of Artificial Intelligence Undermines the Knowledge of Medical Doctors in High-Stakes Contexts (2025) · cites this paper as Pritchard, 2007
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- Authors
- Pritchard, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Stirling (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Pritchard, Duncan
- ORCID
- Pritchard, Duncan
- Venue
- Synthese
- Published
- 2006-10-10
- Volume
- 158
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 277-297
- ISSN
- 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0964
- OpenAlex
- W2092707543
- Cited by
- 408
- References
- 62
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 31 · 2021: 33 · 2020: 46 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 44 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 47.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Synthese (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/D500494/1)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Keywords
- epistemic luck
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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