The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A systems approach to organizational error
Abstract
The past two decades have seen a significant number of large-scale disasters in a wide range of hazardous, well-defended technologies. Despite their differences, the root causes of these accidents have been traced to latent failures and organizational errors arising in the upper echelons of the system in question. A model of the aetiology of these organizational accidents is outlined. The model describes two interrelated causal sequences: (a) an active failure pathway that originates in top-level decisions and proceeds via error-producing and violation-promoting conditions in the various workplaces to unsafe acts committed by those at the immediate human-system interface and (b) a latent failure pathway that runs directly from the organizational processes to deficiencies in the system's defences. The paper goes on to identify two sets of dependencies associated with latent failures and violations. Organizational errors increase the likelihood of operator error through the active failure pathway and, at the same time, enhance the possibility of adverse outcomes through defensive weaknesses. Violations have a narrower range of consequences. Non-compliance with safe operating procedures increases the likelihood of error by taking perpetrators into regions of operation in which neither the physical regime nor the hazards are well understood. Violations, by definition, also take perpetrators ‘closer to the edge,’ and thus increase the chance that subsequent errors will have damaging outcomes. The paper concludes by indicating two ways in which the model has been applied in industrial settings: (a) through the development of proactive measures for diagnosing and remedying organizational processes known to be implicated in accident causation, and (b) an accident investigation technique that guides investigators and analysts to the organizational root causes of past accidents.
Overview
Integrity signals
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Claims the paper makes
Citations
Cites
Reason, J. (1990) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139062367 · Cited by 5,108
Self-citationHuman Reliability Analysis: Context and Control
Hollnagel, E. (1994) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 733
Behind Human Error: Cognitive Systems, Computers and Hindsight
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Human Error: Cause, Prediction, and Reduction
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Rausand, M., & Haugen, S. (2020) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781119377351.ch15 · Cited by 118
Tripod Delta: Proactive Approach to Enhanced Safety
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Self-citationBehavioural economics and compliance with safety regulations
Battmann, W., & Klumb, P. L. (1993) · Safety Science · doi:10.1016/0925-7535(93)90005-x · Cited by 82
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TOO LITTLE AND TOO LATE: A COMMENTARY ON ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEMS
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Self-citationNuclear Regulatory Commission, W., Barriere, M. T., Available, N., Brookhaven National Lab., U., Sandia National Labs., A., Luckas, W. J., Whitehead, D., & Ramey-Smith, A. (1994) · doi:10.2172/10171709 · Cited by 14
Research works printed but not linked: 6
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- MEISTER, D., 1977. "Human error in man-machine systems". In: Human Aspects of Man-Made Systems. Milton Keynes: The Open University Press; 1977. pp. 299–324, in S. Brown and J. Martin (eds).
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Cited by
The dynamics of proactivity at work
Grant, A. M., & Ashford, S. J. (2008) · Research in Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.riob.2008.04.002 · Cited by 2,057
“…(e.g., Davidson, Worrell, & Fox, 1996; Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, Hayes, & Wierba, 1997; Fay et al., 2004; Gersick, 1994; Heath, Larrick, & Klayman, 1998; Hui, Lam, & Schaubroeck, 2001; Kirby et al., 2002; Reason, 1995; Swanson, 1995; van Dyck, Frese, Baer, & Sonnentag, 2005; Vredenburgh, 2002).”
Holden, R. J., Carayon, P., Gurses, A. P., Hoonakker, P., Hundt, A. S., Ozok, A. A., & Rivera-Rodriguez, A. J. (2013) · Ergonomics · doi:10.1080/00140139.2013.838643 · Cited by 1,221
“latent, accumulated) effect on outcomes later on (Reason 1995) or uncover migrations towards higher levels of risk, tighter coupling or the normalisation of deviance (Cook and Rasmussen 2005).”
BackgroundContributing factors in construction accidents
Haslam, R. A., Hide, S. A., Gibb, A. G. F., Gyi, D. E., Pavitt, T., Atkinson, S., & Duff, A. R. (2005) · Applied Ergonomics · doi:10.1016/j.apergo.2004.12.002 · Cited by 1,005
“In this context, it is relevant to note Reason’s point that unsafe acts, just as much as their less frequent bad outcomes, are consequences as much as causes in the accident chain of events (Reason, 1995).”
Koppel, R., Wetterneck, T., Telles, J. L., & Karsh, B.-T. (2008) · Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association · doi:10.1197/jamia.m2616 · Cited by 685
“Therefore, reiterating existing rules or enacting more rules may not reduce workarounds.(38-44) BCMA patient safety is best served by improving system design, workflow integration, and implementation,(27,44-46) especially BCMA-specific impediments.”
BackgroundWhat Practices Will Most Improve Safety?: Evidence-Based Medicine Meets Patient Safety
Leape, L. L., Berwick, D. M., & Bates, D. W. (2002) · JAMA · doi:10.1001/jama.288.4.501 · Cited by 575
Metadata
- Authors
- REASON, J.
- Affiliations
- University of Manchester (GB)
- Corresponding author
- REASON, JAMES
- Venue
- Ergonomics
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 1995-08
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1708-1721
- ISSN
- 0014-0139 (ISSN-L)
- 1366-5847
- OpenAlex
- W1996094105
- Cited by
- 340
- References
- 11
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 37 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 21 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 17 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 13.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Ergonomics (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Transport Canada
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Occupational Health and Safety Research
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality › Risk and Safety Analysis
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Patient Safety and Medication Errors
- Keywords
- organizational errors, latent failures, active failures, accident causes, human-system interface, unsafe acts, rule violations, accident investigation, hazardous technologies, systems approach
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A systems approach to organizational error. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/00140139508925221
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- REASON, J. (1995). A systems approach to organizational error. Ergonomics. https://doi.org/10.1080/00140139508925221
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.