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Cited by 248

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Social Dilemmas

Dawes, Robyn M., Messick, David M.·2000·International Journal of Psychology

Abstract

In social dilemma situations, each individual always receives a higher payoff for defecting than for cooperating, but all are better off if all cooperate than if all defect. Often, however, people in social dilemmas attend more to the group's payoffs than to their own, either automatically or to behave “appropriately.” But whereas social identity elicits cooperative behaviour in dilemmas, it is generally only for the benefit of an “in‐group.” Dilemmas between groups (requiring self‐sacrificial behaviour within) are often the most extreme. Consequently, the framing and manipulation of group identity is critical to cooperation rate as demonstrated by careful laboratory experimentation.

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Metadata

Authors
Dawes, R. M., & Messick, D. M.
Venue
International Journal of Psychology
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2000-04
Volume
35
Issue
2
Pages
111-116
ISSN
  • 0020-7594 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-066X
OpenAlex
W4240420052
Cited by
248
References
1
FWCI
7.67
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Social Dilemmas. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/002075900399402
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Dawes, R. M., & Messick, D. M. (2000). Social Dilemmas. International Journal of Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/002075900399402

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.