Cited by 2,022Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsEmotions and Moral Behavior

Social Dilemmas

Dawes, R M·1980·Annual Review of Psychology

Abstract

A revolution in the science of emotion has emerged in recent decades, with the potential to create a paradigm shift in decision theories. The research reveals that emotions constitute potent, pervasive, predictable, sometimes harmful and sometimes ...Read More

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Crossref · 10.1146/annurev.ps.31.020180.001125

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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Each individual's payoff for a non-cooperative choice is higher than their payoff for a cooperative one.

    “Each individual's payoff for a non-cooperative choice is higher than their payoff for a cooperative one.”
  • Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance.

    “Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”

    From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [8]

  • When individual incentives diverge from collective welfare, social dilemmas emerge-classical tragedy-of-the-commons scenarios in which selfish use of shared resources degrades outcomes for all involved.

    “When individual incentives diverge from collective welfare, social dilemmas emerge -classical tragedy-of-the-commons scenarios in which selfish use of shared resources degrades outcomes for all involved (Hardin, 1968;Dawes, 1980;Field & Ostrom, 1992).”
  • Costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games, which shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.

    “The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [43]

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Authors
Dawes, R. M.
Corresponding author
Dawes, R M
Venue
Annual Review of Psychology
Published
1980-01
Volume
31
Issue
1
Pages
169-193
ISSN
  • 0066-4308 (ISSN-L)
  • 1545-2085
OpenAlex
W4252488326
Cited by
2,022
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 76 · 2025: 83 · 2024: 66 · 2023: 76 · 2022: 90 · 2021: 75 · 2020: 82 · 2019: 80 · 2018: 83 · 2017: 85 · 2016: 95 · 2015: 70 · 2014: 67 · 2013: 72 · 2012: 69
FWCI
63.72
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Annual Review of Psychology (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
Keywords
social dilemmas, emotions, decision-making

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