The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Nature of Laws
Abstract
This paper is concerned with the question of the truth conditions of nomological statements. My fundamental thesis is that it is possible to set out an acceptable, non Circular account of the truth conditions of laws and nomological statements if and only if relations among universals — that is, among properties and relations, construed realistically — are taken as the truth-makers for such statements. My discussion will be restricted to strictly universal, nonstatistical laws. The reason for this limitation is not that I feel there is anything dubious about the concept of a statistical law, nor that I feel that basic laws cannot be statistical. The reason is methodological. The case of strictly universal, nonstatistical laws would seem to be the simplest case. If the problem of the truth conditions of laws can be solved for this simple subcase, one can then investigate whether the solution can be extended to the more complex cases. I believe that the solution I propose here does have that property, though I shall not pursue that question here.
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In the citing paper
“Tooley (1977) considers an example of Smith's Garden, and there he seems open to accept spatiotemporally restricted laws if they are significant enough.”
From Governing Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature (2022) · cites this paper as Tooley (1977)
In the citing paper
“But this appears to be false; there appear to be worlds that match in their mosaics but differ in their laws.”
From Nomothetic Explanation and Humeanism about Laws of Nature (2020) · cites this paper as Tooley (1977, p. 669)
Citations
Cites
The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap.
Kyburg, H., & Schilpp, P. A. (1968) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024353 · Cited by 1,173
The Logical Foundations of Probability
Kyburg, & Journal of Philosophy, I. (1963) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2023655 · Cited by 856
General Propositions and Causality
Ramsey, F. P. (1931) · Apollo (University of Cambridge) · Cited by 516
Sosa, E. (1975) · Oxford University Press eBooks · Cited by 471
A causal theory of counterfactuals
Jackson, F. (1977) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048407712341001 · Cited by 270
A semantic analysis of conditional logic1
STALNAKER, R. C., & THOMASON, R. H. (1970) · Theoria · doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1970.tb00408.x · Cited by 221
Law Statements and Counterfactual Inference
Chisholm, R. M. (1955) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/15.5.97 · Cited by 155
Counterfactuals and Possible Worlds
Bennett, J. (1974) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.1974.10716947 · Cited by 145
The Foundations of Mathematics.
Kattsoff, L. O., & Beth, E. W. (1961) · American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.2307/2311173 · Cited by 34
Ishizuka, M. (1992) · Journal of Japan Society for Fuzzy Theory and Intelligent Informatics · doi:10.3156/jfuzzy.4.4_620 · Cited by 5
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Scheffler, 1963, The Anatomy of Inquiry, 218
- Lewis's, 1973, Counterfactuals
Cited by
Fraassen, B. C. V. (1989) · doi:10.1093/0198248601.001.0001 · Cited by 1,821
Armstrong, D. M. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139171700 · Cited by 1,415
A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable
Chakravartty, A. (2007) · Cited by 462
Swoyer, C. (1982) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048408212340641 · Cited by 402
Koslicki, K. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539895.001.0001 · Cited by 379
Metadata
- Authors
- Tooley, M.
- Affiliations
- Australian National University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Tooley, Michael
- ORCID
- Tooley, Michael
- Venue
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1977-12
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 667-698
- ISSN
- 0045-5091 (ISSN-L)
- 1911-0820
- OpenAlex
- W1914925089
- Semantic Scholar
- 6ea4c658a25266a35abb23c984d68d6acb4f075d
- Cited by
- 681
- References
- 11
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 45 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 39 · 2019: 127 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 17 · 2014: 20 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 14
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- truthmakers, universals, German Basic Law, statistical laws
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- Tooley, M. (1977). The Nature of Laws. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1977.10716190
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.