Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Warfare: A Perfect Storm of Instability?
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A significant gap exists between the expectations and fears of public opinion, policymakers, and global defense communities about artificial intelligence (AI) and its actual military capabilities, ...
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Tiny electromagnetic jammers and cyberweapons can interfere with communication networks and the adversary's targeting sensors, eroding the defenses of the adversary's multitiered air system.
“Tese tiny electromagnetic jammers and cyberweapons can interfere with communication networks and the adversary's targeting sensors, eroding the defenses of the adversary's multitiered air system in readiness for long-range stealth bomber offensive attacks and drone swarms.”
From Artificial Intelligence in the Military: An Overview of the Capabilities, Applications, and Challenges (2023) · cites this paper as [110]
Loitering attack munitions (LAM) are more dangerous and lethal than cruise missiles because they are AI-augmented, allowing them to fire down any projectiles faster than human operators and stay in the air longer.
“LAMs are more dangerous and lethal than cruise missiles since they are AI-augmented, allowing them to fre down any projectiles faster than human operators and stay in the air longer [110].”
From Artificial Intelligence in the Military: An Overview of the Capabilities, Applications, and Challenges (2023) · cites this paper as [110]
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- Authors
- Johnson, J.
- Corresponding author
- Johnson, James
- ORCID
- Johnson, James
- Venue
- The Washington Quarterly
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2020-04-02
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 197-211
- ISSN
- 0163-660X (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9177
- OpenAlex
- W3035899309
- Cited by
- 50
- References
- 35
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 1
- FWCI
- 25.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doras.dcu.ie
- Licence
- cc-by-nc-sa
- Locations
- The Washington Quarterly (publishedVersion)
- Dublin City University Open Access Institutional Repository (Dublin City University) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-sa)
- Arrow@dit (Dublin Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Nuclear Issues and Defense
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Military Strategy and Technology
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies
- Keywords
- artificial intelligence, nuclear war, nuclear deterrence, strategic stability, military capabilities, nuclear strategy, public perception of AI, defense policy
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