The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
Abstract
In Epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker makes a tremendous contribution to theorizing the intersection of social epistemology with theories of justice. Theories of justice often take as their object of assessment either interpersonal transactions (specific exchanges between persons) or particular institutions. They may also take a more comprehensive perspective in assessing systems of institutions. This systemic perspective may enable control of the cumulative effects of millions of individual transactions that cannot be controlled at the individual or institutional levels. This is true not only with respect to the overall distribution of such goods as income and wealth, but also with respect to the goods of testimonial and hermeneutical justice. Cognitive biases that may be difficult for even epistemically virtuous individuals to correct on their own may be more susceptible to correction if we focus on the principles that should govern our systems of testimonial gathering and assessment. Hence, while Fricker’s focus on individual epistemic virtue is important, we also need to consider what epistemic justice as a virtue of social systems would require. My paper will indicate some directions forward on this front, focusing on the need for integration of diverse institutions and persons engaged in inquiry.
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Cites
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition
Rawls, J. (1971) · doi:10.4159/9780674042605 · Cited by 9,496
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Fricker, M. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 · Cited by 9,198
Johnson, K., & Nozick, R. (1975) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/447864 · Cited by 7,692
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.82.6.878 · Cited by 7,364
Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.102.1.4 · Cited by 6,682
Nozick, R. (2018) · Princeton Readings in Political Thought · doi:10.2307/j.ctv19fvzzk.69 · Cited by 6,631
The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love and Outgroup Hate?
Brewer, M. B. (1999) · Journal of Social Issues · doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00126 · Cited by 3,494
(2000) · Cited by 2,172
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Anderson, E. (2010) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400836826 · Cited by 1,381
Self-citation
Cited by
Epistemic injustice in healthcare: a philosophial analysis
Carel, H., & Kidd, I. J. (2014) · Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s11019-014-9560-2 · Cited by 749
Epistemic Injustice and Illness
Kidd, I. J., & Carel, H. (2017) · Journal of Applied Philosophy · doi:10.1111/japp.12172 · Cited by 466
Epistemic injustice in academic global health
Bhakuni, H., & Abimbola, S. (2021) · The Lancet Global Health · doi:10.1016/s2214-109x(21)00301-6 · Cited by 442
Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: A Case for Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice
Davis, E. (2016) · Hypatia · doi:10.1111/hypa.12251 · Cited by 338
Epistemic Injustice and the Preservation of Ignorance
Fricker, M. (2016) · The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance · doi:10.1017/9780511820076.010 · Cited by 243
Metadata
- Authors
- Anderson, E.
- Venue
- Social Epistemology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2012-04
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 163-173
- ISSN
- 0269-1728 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-5297
- OpenAlex
- W2093858681
- Cited by
- 882
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 16.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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