CoChat

ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding

Open access
Malfatti, Federica Isabella · 2025 · Social Epistemology

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 58 of the 58 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 7 of the 10 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

Is ChatGPT a good teacher? Or could it be? As understanding is widely acknowledged as one of the fundamental aims of education, the answer to these questions depends on whether ChatGPT fosters or could foster the acquisition of understanding in its users. In this paper, I tackle this issue in two steps. In the first part of the paper, I explore and analyze the set of skills and social-epistemic virtues that a teacher must exemplify to perform her job well – in those contexts in which epistemic aims are at play and in which understanding plays a pivotal role. In the second part of the paper, I put my conception of good teacher to test and deal with the question whether, and to which extent, the software ChatGPT is (or could serve as, if suitably modified or fine-tuned) a good teacher for its users. I close with some final reflections that point to further directions of research.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This paper asks whether ChatGPT is or could be a good teacher, focusing on education’s epistemic aim of understanding. It argues that good teaching requires social-epistemic virtues such as intellectual honesty, epistemic empathy, and epistemic care, and that ChatGPT can sometimes behave as if it has empathy and care but cannot genuinely care because it is a predictive algorithm.

Key findings

  • Sincerity is not a classroom virtue: the insincere teachers Stella and Lilith can effectively generate knowledge and understanding if they are competent and intellectually honest, i.e. stably tethered to the best available evidence.
  • Epistemic empathy and epistemic care are central to fostering objectual understanding; epistemic care requires not just caring behavior but a motivational structure grounded in appreciation of the other’s epistemic well-being.
  • In the author’s tests, ChatGPT 4.0 behaved in ways that would be called epistemically empathetic or caring if done by a human: it inferred an unspoken why-question about flamingos at Lake Constance, offered multiple possible explanations, tailored an explanation for a 4-year-old, and responded to a flat-Earth prompt by simulating flat-Earth arguments while noting they are unsupported.
  • A hypothetical accuracy-fine-tuned “ChatGPT 95” would be intellectually honest and a reliable source of knowledge, but whether it fosters understanding depends on whether it could possess and exercise epistemic empathy and epistemic care; ChatGPT can take care of users epistemically but cannot truly care about their epistemic well-being.

Methods

  • Conceptual/philosophical analysis of understanding, teacher virtues, and ChatGPT, assuming for the sake of argument an objectualist and antireductionist conception of understanding.
  • The paper examines three social-epistemic virtues in education: intellectual honesty, epistemic empathy, and epistemic care.
  • It uses the author’s own interactions with ChatGPT 4.0 as illustrative tests, including prompts about wild flamingos at Lake Constance, explaining flamingos to a 4-year-old, and defending a flat-Earth belief.

Limitations

  • The author states that some empirical claims—e.g. that teaching and learning run smoother with an epistemically caring teacher, and that students are more prone to trust such a teacher—are hard to back up from the armchair and not fully justified.
  • The author notes that the reflections on epistemic care hold only under the assumption of a friendly or ideal epistemic environment, not one affected by polarization or epistemic injustice.
  • The author restricts attention to ChatGPT and says only a comparative analysis of different LLMs could confirm whether the arguments apply more generally; the text also makes evident that the ChatGPT evidence is anecdotal single-user interaction rather than a controlled empirical study.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1080/02691728.2025.2449599

Cites

58 of 58 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Image 1
CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 2
CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 3
CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 4
CC-BY · From the PDF

Verification

Claims the paper makes

6 Valid · 6 Not valid · 1 Not checked · 69 Own results and interpretations

19 more claims

Create a free account to see all 82 claims and every source verdict.

See all claims — free account
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 53
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 15
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1

Create a free account to see these claims.

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

1 of 1

Citations

Cites

Show all 58 references

Cited by

See all 21

Metadata

Authors
Malfatti, F. I.
Affiliations
Universität Innsbruck (AT)
Corresponding author
Malfatti, Federica Isabella
Venue
Social Epistemology
Published
2025-01-21
Volume
39
Issue
6
Pages
652-666
ISSN
  • 0269-1728 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-5297
OpenAlex
W4406630582
Cited by
21
References
53
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 12
FWCI
17.46
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Social Epistemology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
  • Digital Library of the University of Innsbruck (University of Innsbruck) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
Tiroler Wissenschaftsförderung (F.32999/7-2021)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Education › Artificial Intelligence in Education
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Education, Philosophy, and Society
Keywords
ChatGPT, understanding, intellectual virtues, teacher skills, AI-assisted learning

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.

A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-05, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).

A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-05 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).

Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/02691728.2025.2449599
The paper
Malfatti, F. I. (2025). ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding. Social Epistemology. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2025.2449599

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.