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Cited by 15Education, Philosophy, and SocietyEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsEducational Theory and Curriculum Studies

Education as the Social Cultivation of Intellectual Virtue

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Croce, Michel, Pritchard, Duncan·2022·Social Virtue Epistemology
DOI 10.4324/9780367808952-78
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Abstract

The recent literature has seen a burgeoning discussion of the idea that the overarching epistemic goal of education is the cultivation of the intellectual virtues. Moreover, there have been attempts to put this idea into practice, with virtue-led educational interventions in schools, universities, and even prisons. This chapter explores the question of whether ⏤ and, if so, to what degree ⏤ such intellectual virtue-based approaches to education are essentially social. The focus in this regard is on the role of intellectual exemplars within this approach, and in particular the extent to which direct social interaction with such exemplars is crucial to the implementation of this educational methodology.

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  • Understanding is widely acknowledged as one of the fundamental epistemic goals of education.

    “As understanding is widely acknowledged as one of the fundamental aims of education, the answer to these questions depends on whether ChatGPT fosters or could foster the acquisition of understanding in its users.”

    From ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding (2025) · cites this paper as Croce and Pritchard 2022

    Section 1 (page unavailable) identifies understanding as a possible epistemic aim of education and an elevated epistemic good. It does not establish that understanding is widely acknowledged as a fundamental aim; the paper instead develops an account centered on cultivating intellectual character. (LLM, conf=0.86)

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2 of the 78 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 14

  1. Alfano, M. (2012). 'Extending the Situationist Challenge to Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology', Philosophical Quarterly 62, 223-49.
  2. M. Alfano & A. Fairweather, 192-215, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  3. --(2014). 'Intellectual Virtues', Handbook of Virtue Ethics, (ed.)
  4. M. Alfano & A. Fairweather, 168- 91, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  5. K. Timpe & C. Boyd, ch. 13, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  6. Hitchcock, D. (2018). 'Critical Thinking', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (ed.)
  7. ¾¾ (2018). Virtuous Emotions, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  8. Levinson, M. (2012). No Citizen Left Behind, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  9. --(2014). 'Knowledge and Understanding', Virtue Scientia: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, (ed.) A. Fairweather, 315-28, Dordrecht, Holland: Springer.
  10. R. Curren, London: Routledge.
  11. --(2003). 'Cultivating Reason', A Companion to the Philosophy of Education, (ed.) R. Curren, 305-31, Oxford: Blackwell.
  12. Turri, J., Alfano, M., & Greco, J. (2017). 'Virtue Epistemology', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (ed.)
  13. Wolf, S. (1982). 'Moral Saints', Journal of Philosophy 79, 419-39.
  14. There is a lively debate in the literature about whether an intellectual character-based education should be aiming at the development of the intellectual virtues or merely at certain critical thinking capacities. See, for example, Siegel (1988, 1997, 2017, 2017),

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Authors
Croce, M., & Pritchard, D.
Affiliations
University of California, Irvine (US)
ORCID
Venue
Social Virtue Epistemology
Publisher
Routledge
Published
2022-06-10
Pages
583-601
DOI
10.4324/9780367808952-78
OpenAlex
W4281749350
Cited by
14
References
78
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 1
FWCI
39.53
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nd)
  • CINECA IRIS Institutial Research Information System (University of Genoa) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Education, Philosophy, and Society
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Educational Theory and Curriculum Studies
Keywords
intellectual virtues, social interaction, moral education, virtue ethics

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