Selection Effects and Deterrence
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The empirical question of how often deterrent threats issued during international disputes succeed has been hotly debated for years, with some researchers arguing that virtually no robust cases of success can be identified. I argue that what appears to be an empirical and methodological debate actually arises from the inadequacy of classical rational deterrence theory, which fails to comprehend the implications of states' strategic self-selection into international disputes. Rational self-selection is shown to imply that in a sample of crises, deterrent threats issued after an initial challenge will tend to fail in precisely those cases where they are relatively most credible signals of an intent to resist with force. The product of a selection effect, this paradoxical implication allows a resolution of the debate on the efficacy of deterrence in crises. And because selection effects can arise whenever a historical "case" is the product of choices by actors who also influence the outcome in question, this example from the study of deterrence has broad relevance for empirical research.
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Cites
Rationalist explanations for war
Fearon, J. D. (1995) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033324 · Cited by 3,995
Self-citationPerception and Misperception in International Politics
Jervis, R. (2017) · doi:10.1515/9781400885114 · Cited by 3,199
Cited by
International Crises and Domestic Politics
Smith, A. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585485 · Cited by 458
Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy
Greenhill, K. M. (2010) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/9780801458668 · Cited by 386
Reputation and Status as Motives for War
Dafoe, A., Renshon, J., & Huth, P. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421 · Cited by 322
Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy
Sechser, T. S., & Fuhrmann, M. (2016) · doi:10.1017/9781316227305 · Cited by 155
The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory-Toward a New Research Agenda
Lupovici, A. (2010) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00606.x · Cited by 126
Metadata
- Authors
- Fearon, J.
- Venue
- International Interactions
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 5-29
- ISSN
- 0305-0629 (ISSN-L)
- 1547-7444
- OpenAlex
- W2150317866
- Cited by
- 110
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 16.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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