Towards a new paradigm of moral personhood
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Moral psychology is between paradigms. Kohlberg's model of moral rationality has proved inadequate in explaining action; yet its augmentation—moral personality—awaits empirical embodiment. This article addresses some critical issues in developing a comprehensive empirical paradigm of moral personhood. Is a first‐person or a third‐person definition of moral behaviour more appropriate? Is operative moral judgement better understood as deliberative or intuitive? What is the essential nature of the moral self? Two basic constructs of moral personality which have been posited to help span the judgement–action gap—moral centrality and integrity—are critically reviewed and some criteria are proffered for evaluating competing models of moral personhood. Significant directions for future research are noted with the hope of moving the field towards a new paradigm of moral personhood. While the content of this paradigm will differ markedly from Kohlberg's, we contend that the spirit of his enterprise will be manifest with vigour redoubled.
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Citations
Cites
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“Owing to their highly self-central and evaluative nature, these experiences of (in)congruity are highly motivating (Steele, 1988) and thus provide a launching point for the study of moral motivation.”
BackgroundThe self-importance of moral identity
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Cited by
A mutualistic approach to morality: The evolution of fairness by partner choice
Baumard, N., André, J.-B., & Sperber, D. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11002202 · Cited by 668
Moral identity as moral ideal self: Links to adolescent outcomes
Hardy, S. A., Walker, L. J., Olsen, J. A., Woodbury, R. D., & Hickman, J. R. (2014) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0033598 · Cited by 182
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“As Frimer and Walker (2008) pointed out, “moral psychology is controversial stuff” (p. 333) and offer several reasons that even a scholar’s friend might react to it with resistance: The friend is not ready to concede the existence of morality in the first place, what morality means in the second…”
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“The paper by Jeremy Frimer and Lawrence Walker ( 2008 ) echoes that thought, saying that ‘moral psychology is between paradigms’ and requires ‘a new paradigm of moral personhood’ (p.”
BackgroundAkbari, R., & Tajik, L. (2012) · Journal of Moral Education · doi:10.1080/03057240.2011.630384 · Cited by 29
Metadata
- Authors
- Frimer, J. A., & Walker, L. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Moral Education
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2008-09
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 333-356
- ISSN
- 0305-7240 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-3877
- OpenAlex
- W1992134914
- Cited by
- 75
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 35.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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