The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Emotion and action
Abstract
The role of emotion in human action has long been neglected in the philosophy of action. Some prevalent misconceptions of the nature of emotion are responsible for this neglect: emotions are irrational; emotions are passive; and emotions have only an insignificant impact on actions. In this paper we argue that these assumptions about the nature of emotion are problematic and that the neglect of emotion's place in theories of action is untenable. More positively, we argue on the basis of recent research in cognitive neuroscience that emotions may significantly affect action generation as well as action execution and control. Moreover, emotions also play a crucial role in people's explanation of action. We conclude that the concept of emotion deserves a more distinctive and central place in philosophical theories of action.
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Cites
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The emerging field of emotion regulation: an integrative review
Gross, J. J. (1998) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.3.271 · Cited by 9,916
Implementation intentions: Strong effects of simple plans.
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1999) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.54.7.493 · Cited by 5,478
The unbearable automaticity of being
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.54.7.462 · Cited by 3,699 · cited 1×
“…is an increasing number of psychological ndings indicating that a great deal of our daily life is driven by automatic, unintended and unconscious mental processes, which involve little intention, attention, effort, control and awareness (Bargh, 1997, Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Kirsch & Lynn, 1999).”
BackgroundUnconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
Libet, B. (1985) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00044903 · Cited by 2,623
Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes
Dretske, F. (1988) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2927.001.0001 · Cited by 1,512
Explanation and Scientific Understanding
Friedman, M. (1974) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024924 · Cited by 1,386 · cited 1×
“A distinctive function of explanation is to unify and systematize our body of knowledge (Friedman, 1974; Kitcher, 1981).”
Background
Cited by
A Theory of Regret Regulation 1.0
Zeelenberg, M., & Pieters, R. (2007) · Journal of Consumer Psychology · doi:10.1207/s15327663jcp1701_3 · Cited by 1,009
Future‐oriented emotions: conceptualization and behavioral effects
Baumgartner, H., Pieters, R., & Bagozzi, R. P. (2008) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.467 · Cited by 430
Jackson, J., & Sunshine, J. (2007) · The British Journal of Criminology · doi:10.1093/bjc/azl031 · Cited by 360
LIDA: A Systems-level Architecture for Cognition, Emotion, and Learning
Franklin, S., Madl, T., D'Mello, S., & Snaider, J. (2014) · IEEE Transactions on Autonomous Mental Development · doi:10.1109/tamd.2013.2277589 · Cited by 261
Feelings and functions in the fear of crime: Applying a new approach to victimisation insecurity
Gray, E., Jackson, J., & Farrall, S. (2011) · British Journal of Criminology · doi:10.1093/bjc/azq066 · Cited by 235
Metadata
- Authors
- Zhu, J., & Thagard, P.
- Venue
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2002-03
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 19-36
- ISSN
- 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-394X
- OpenAlex
- W2081941052
- Cited by
- 161
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 1.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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