Cited by 3,699Neural and Behavioral Psychology StudiesBehavioral Health and InterventionsDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics

The unbearable automaticity of being

Bargh, John A., Chartrand, Tanya L.·1999·American Psychologist

Abstract

What was noted by E. J. hanger (1978) remains true today: that much of contemporary psychological research is based on the assumption that people are consciously and systematically processing incoming information in order to construe and interpret their world and to plan and engage in courses of action. As did E. J. hanger, the authors question this assumption. First, they review evidence that the ability to exercise such conscious, intentional control is actually quite limited, so that most of moment-to-moment psychological life must occur through nonconscious means if it is to occur at all. The authors then describe the different possible mechanisms that produce automatic, environmental control over these various phenomena and review evidence establishing both the existence of these mechanisms as well as their consequences for judgments, emotions, and

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Crossref · 10.1037/0003-066x.54.7.462

Cites

148 of 148 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Even apparently rational thought processes are strongly influenced by emotional states.

    “In fact much psychological research (Bargh and Chartrand, 1999; Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Cohen, 2014) demonstrates that even apparently rational thought processes are strongly influenced by emotional states.”
  • Cortical (cognitive) functions are not intrinsically conscious.

    “Coupled with the huge body of evidence suggesting that cortical (cognitive) functions are not intrinsically conscious (see Bargh and Chartrand, 1999, for review)”

    From The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle (2019) · cites this paper as Bargh and Chartrand, 1999

  • The finding that people are often unaware of key behavioural motivations and triggers has been demonstrated previously in experimental studies.

    “The finding that people are often unaware of key behavioural motivations and triggers has been demonstrated previously in experimental studies”

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Authors
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L.
Affiliations
New York University (US)
Venue
American Psychologist
Published
1999-07
Volume
54
Issue
7
Pages
462-479
ISSN
  • 0003-066X (ISSN-L)
  • 1935-990X
OpenAlex
W2130142026
Cited by
3,699
References
151
Citations by year
2026: 78 · 2025: 82 · 2024: 62 · 2023: 77 · 2022: 140 · 2021: 112 · 2020: 146 · 2019: 185 · 2018: 122 · 2017: 140 · 2016: 156 · 2015: 184 · 2014: 217 · 2013: 207 · 2012: 188
FWCI
36.59
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
American Psychologist (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Applied Psychology › Behavioral Health and Interventions
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
automaticity, unconscious processes, conscious control, environmental control, automatic processes, judgment, emotions, intentional control, information processing

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