Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent empirical work calls into question the so-called “Simple View” that an agent who A's intentionally intends to A. In experimental studies, ordinary speakers frequently assent to claims that, in certain cases, agents who knowingly behave wrongly intentionally bring about the harm they do; yet the speakers tend to deny that it was the intention of those agents to cause the harm. This paper reports two additional studies that at first appear to support the original ones, but argues that in fact, the evidence of all the studies considered is best understood in terms of the Simple View.
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Citations
Cites
Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language
Knobe, J. (2003) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/63.3.190 · Cited by 1,046
Cited by
Person as scientist, person as moralist
Knobe, J. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000907 · Cited by 375
The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology
Knobe, J. (2006) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-004-4510-0 · Cited by 311
Doris, J. M., & The Moral Psychology Research Group (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.001.0001 · Cited by 227
Intuitions about consciousness: experimental studies
Knobe, J., & Prinz, J. (2008) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9066-y · Cited by 227
“…suggests that, although some aspects of folk psychology may indeed be best understood as tools for prediction and explanation, others are best understood in terms of their role in facilitating moral judgment (e.g., Cushman 2006; Knobe 2005, forthcoming; Leslie, et al. 2006; McCann 2005; Mele 2003).”
BackgroundThe Epistemic Side-Effect Effect
BEEBE, J. R., & BUCKWALTER, W. (2010) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01398.x · Cited by 188
Metadata
- Authors
- McCann, H. J.
- Venue
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2005-12
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 737-748
- ISSN
- 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-394X
- OpenAlex
- W2025794681
- Cited by
- 94
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 2.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- McCann, H. J. (2005). Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies. Philosophical Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080500355236
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