Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language
Abstract
There has been a long-standing dispute in the philosophical literature about the conditions under which a behavior counts as 'intentional.' Much of the debate turns on questions about the use of certain words and phrases in ordinary language. The present paper investigates these questions empirically, using experimental techniques to investigate people's use of the relevant words and phrases. g
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Participants were much more likely to blame the chairman in the harm condition than to praise him in the help condition.
“Moreover, participants were much more likely to blame the chairman in the harm condition than to praise him in the help condition.”
From Exploring the psychology of LLMs’ moral and legal reasoning (2024) · cites this paper as Knobe, 2003
Knobe (2003) found that 82% of participants in the harm condition said the chairman acted intentionally, compared to only 23% in the help condition.
“Strikingly, 82% of participants in the harm condition said that the chairman acted intentionally, compared to only 23% in the help condition.”
From Exploring the psychology of LLMs’ moral and legal reasoning (2024) · cites this paper as Knobe, 2003
In the Knobe (2003) positive-side-effect condition with reversed answer order, only 3.5% of surveyed GPT runs (18) gave the original 'correct answer' of 'A Lot of Praise'; 0.2% (1) answered second-highest; 96.3% (501) answered 'No Praise'.
“This resulted in only 3.5% of surveyed GPT runs giving the original “correct answer” of ‘A Lot of Praise’ (a total of just 18 runs), 0.2% of GPT runs answering with the second-highest level of praise (a total of just one GPT run), and the remaining 96.3% of GPT runs answering with ‘No Praise’ (a total of 501 runs).”
From Diminished diversity-of-thought in a standard large language model (2024) · cites this paper as Knobe (2003)
In the Knobe (2003) survey, 100% of surveyed GPT-3.5 runs described the negative side effect as deserving the highest degree of blame ('a lot of blame').
“Similarly, 100% of surveyed GPT runs described the negative side effect as deserving of the highest degree of blame, or “a lot of blame.””
From Diminished diversity-of-thought in a standard large language model (2024) · cites this paper as Knobe (2003)
In the Knobe (2003) survey, 99.2% of surveyed GPT-3.5 runs (516 of 520) described the positive side effect as deserving the highest degree of praise ('a lot of praise'); 0.2% (1) second-highest; 0.6% (3) lowest ('no praise').
“Specifically, 99.2% of surveyed GPT runs (a total of 516) described the positive side effect as deserving of the highest degree of praise, or “a lot of praise”; 0.2% of them (a total of just one) described it as deserving of the second-highest degree of praise; and 0.6% of them (a total of three) described it as deserving of the lowest degree of praise, or “no praise.””
From Diminished diversity-of-thought in a standard large language model (2024) · cites this paper as Knobe (2003)
Cites
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Velleman, J. D., & Bratman, M. E. (1991) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185304 · Cited by 2,383 · see citing works
The Folk Concept of Intentionality
Malle, B. F., & Knobe, J. (1997) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1006/jesp.1996.1314 · Cited by 742 · see citing works
Self-citationBratman, M. E. (1984) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184542 · Cited by 367 · see citing works
Intentional action: Controversies, data, and core hypotheses
Mele, A. R. (2003) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080307770 · Cited by 62 · see citing works
Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions
Mele, A. R. (2001) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/3838.003.0005 · Cited by 59 · see citing works
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Explanation in artificial intelligence: Insights from the social sciences
Miller, T. (2019) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2018.07.007 · Cited by 5,302 · see citing works
Many Labs 2: Investigating variation in replicability across samples and settings
Klein, R. A., Vianello, M., Hasselman, F., Adams, B. G., Adams, R. B., Alper, S., Aveyard, M., Axt, J. R., Babalola, M. T., Bahník, Š., et al. (2018) · Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/2515245918810225 · Cited by 944 · see citing works
Three‐month‐olds show a negativity bias in their social evaluations
Kiley Hamlin, J., Wynn, K., & Bloom, P. (2010) · Developmental Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2010.00951.x · Cited by 494 · see citing works
Groups in Mind: The Coalitional Roots of War and Morality
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Acting Intentionally and the Side-Effect Effect: Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment
Leslie, A. M., Knobe, J., & Cohen, A. (2006) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01722.x · Cited by 330 · see citing works
Self-citationDoris, J. M., & The Moral Psychology Research Group (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.001.0001 · Cited by 227 · see citing works
Theory of mind and moral cognition: exploring the connections
Knobe, J. (2005) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.06.011 · Cited by 186 · see citing works
Self-citation(2020) · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/bs.aesp.2020.04.005 · Cited by 112 · see citing works
Hauser, M. D. (2006) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsl026 · Cited by 87 · see citing works
Diminished diversity-of-thought in a standard large language model
Park, P. S., Schoenegger, P., & Zhu, C. (2024) · Behavior Research Methods · doi:10.3758/s13428-023-02307-x · Cited by 83 · see citing works
Sauer, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108529181 · Cited by 72 · see citing works
Exploring the psychology of LLMs’ moral and legal reasoning
Almeida, G. F. C. F., Nunes, J. L., Engelmann, N., Wiegmann, A., & Araújo, M. D. (2024) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2024.104145 · Cited by 70 · see citing works
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Moral coherence processes: constructing culpability and consequences
Clark, C. J., Chen, E. E., & Ditto, P. H. (2015) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.07.016 · Cited by 50 · see citing works
- Authors
- Knobe, J.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Knobe, J.
- ORCID
- Knobe, J.
- Venue
- Analysis
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2003-07-01
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 190-194
- ISSN
- 0003-2638 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8284
- OpenAlex
- W3121819056
- Cited by
- 1,046
- References
- 5
- Citations by year
- 2026: 32 · 2025: 54 · 2024: 44 · 2023: 63 · 2022: 70 · 2021: 63 · 2020: 57 · 2019: 58 · 2018: 50 · 2017: 40 · 2016: 56 · 2015: 52 · 2014: 67 · 2013: 36 · 2012: 86
- FWCI
- 6.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Analysis (publishedVersion)
- CogPrints (University of Southampton) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Language and Linguistics › Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
- Keywords
- intentional action, adverse effects, ordinary language, intentionalism, experimental philosophy
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