Cited by 103Mental Health and PsychiatryPsychology and Mental HealthIdentity, Memory, and Therapy

Self-concept through the diagnostic looking glass: narratives and mental disorder

Open access
Tekin, Şerife·2011·Philosophical Psychology

Abstract

This paper explores how the diagnosis of mental disorder may affect the diagnosed subject's self-concept by supplying an account that emphasizes the influence of autobiographical and social narratives on self-understanding. It focuses primarily on the diagnoses made according to the criteria provided by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), and suggests that the DSM diagnosis may function as a source of narrative that affects the subject's self-concept. Engaging in this analysis by appealing to autobiographies and memoirs written by people diagnosed with mental disorder, the paper concludes that a DSM diagnosis is a double-edged sword for self-concept. On the one hand, it sets the subject's experience in an established classificatory system which can facilitate self-understanding by providing insight into the subject's condition and guiding her personal growth, as well as treatment and recovery. In this sense, the DSM diagnosis may have positive repercussions on self-development. On the other hand, however, given the DSM's symptom-based approach and its adoption of the Biomedical Disease model, a diagnosis may force the subject to make sense of her condition divorced from other elements in her life that may be affecting her mental-health. It may lead her to frame her experience only as an irreversible imbalance. This form of self-understanding may set limits on the subject's hopes of recovery and may create impediments to her flourishing.

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1080/09515089.2011.559622

Cites

49 of 49 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Tekin (112) pointed to risks of diagnosis being a "double-edged sword" that on one hand may facilitate self-understanding and communication, while on the other hand may lead users to make sense of situations focusing only on unrealistic dichotomous outcomes.

    “Tekin (112) pointed to risks of diagnosis being a “double-edged sword” that on one hand may facilitate self-understanding and communication, while on the other hand may lead users to make sense of situations focusing only on unrealistic dichotomous outcomes.”

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. American Psychiatric Association (APA). (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (4th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press.
  2. Fireman, G. D., McVay, T. E., & Flanagan, O. (Eds.). (2003). Introduction. In Narrative and consciousness: Literature, psychology and the brain (pp. 3-16). New York: Oxford University Press.
  3. Hacking, I. (2007b). Natural kinds: Rosy dawn, scholastic twilight. In A. O'Hear (Ed.), Philosophy of science (pp. 203-240). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
  4. Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  5. Scheff, T. J. (1976). Labelling madness. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
  6. White, R. (2008). Finding my mind. In S. Hinshaw (Ed.), Breaking the silence (pp. 44-69). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Tekin, Ş.
Affiliations
Dalhousie University (CA)
Corresponding author
Tekin, Şerife
Venue
Philosophical Psychology
Published
2011-06
Volume
24
Issue
3
Pages
357-380
ISSN
  • 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
  • 1465-394X
OpenAlex
W1968594721
Cited by
103
References
49
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 6
FWCI
26.18
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Philosophical Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Clinical Psychology › Psychology and Mental Health
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Identity, Memory, and Therapy
Keywords
self-concept, psychiatric diagnosis, DSM, autobiographical narrative, social narratives, self-understanding, symptom-based classification, recovery, eudaimonia

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review